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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The goal of this study is to identify lessons learned for successfully developing and 
implementing high-speed rail (HSR) in the United States. Few broad statements can be 
made about high-speed ground transportation (HSGT) in the United States, but two points 
are clear:
1. With the exception of the Northeast Corridor, there has been relatively little forward 
movement if one looks at the number of years spent on many of these projects.
2. The federal government has played and continues to play a minimal role in HSGT, 
generally restricting its efforts to funding pilot studies and technological research.
Given the early stages of these projects, “success” cannot be based on implementation, but is 
defined in terms of whether a given HSR project is still actively pursuing development and/
or funding.
This study proceeded in two phases. Phase 1 was a literature review following two parallel 
tracks: an assessment of federal and, where warranted, state legislation to determine what 
was intended in terms of objectives and criteria identified in the legislation; and a broader 
literature review that briefly assessed all HSR efforts in the United States since 1980 to 
determine their history and current status. The result was an interim report, written by 
Allison C. de Cerreño. Recommendations were made after Phase 1 to examine in more 
depth three case studies: California, Florida, and the Pacific Northwest. Phase 2 consisted of 
additional literature review and interviews with key individuals related to those three case 
studies. This final report includes the results of both Phase 1 and Phase 2.
Allison C. de Cerreño researched and wrote the Florida case study, along with the Executive 
Summary, the Introduction, the Synopsis of High-Speed Rail in the United States, and the 
concluding section of the report. Daniel Evans researched and wrote the two case studies on 
California and the Pacific Northwest. Howard Permut provided overall guidance on the 
structuring of the case studies and development of lessons learned, helped formulate the 
critical questions to address, and identified both the key players in the cases and the types of 
information that should be included.
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METHODOLOGY
The first step was to identify as many cases of HSGT efforts in the country since 1980 as 
possible. An extensive review revealed 19 cases. The cases offer a complex array of examples 
with differences in a number of areas, including, but not limited to, the type of HSGT 
being pursued; whether the project exists entirely in one state or spans several; the way 
funding is being sought, both in terms of partnerships and the actual funding mechanisms; 
whether the public is involved through voting and/or legislation; and the role of freight rail. 
In many cases, early feasibility studies and environmental impact studies have been or are 
being developed, but often on only a portion of a project, leading to a document trail that 
often has to be pieced together.
The 19 projects were differentiated according to the type of system proposed:
• Incremental high-speed rail, which generally uses existing technologies and rights-of-
way, but makes improvements to allow for speeds up to 150 miles per hour (mph) 
(although in the United States, most projects aim for 110 mph) using either electrified 
or nonelectrified systems
• New high-speed rail, which requires new rights-of-way and imported technologies 
currently used in Asia or Europe, that typically would allow for speeds of just over 
200 mph
• Magnetic levitation (Maglev) which, by doing away with steel-wheel-on-steel-rail, 
would allow speeds in excess of 300 mph
Because Maglev uses a completely different technology and different sources of federal 
funding, the lessons learned from those examples might not be helpful for other HSR 
efforts. Given the scope of and resources for this study, Maglev projects were excluded from 
the remainder of the study. The final fifteen projects—three new HSR and twelve 
incremental HSR—were briefly assessed in terms of their history and current status. 
California, Florida, and the Pacific Northwest were chosen for Phase 2.
FINDINGS, LESSONS, AND THEMES FOR CONSIDERATION 
Several specific findings and lessons were learned from each of the three case studies. The 
following broad themes for consideration were apparent.
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Leadership by the Federal Government
First and foremost is the need for leadership by the federal government, both in vision and 
funding—and both have been lacking for some time. Amtrak has attempted to fill this void 
to a degree but has been hampered by politics and funding issues.
Funding for both passenger rail and freight rail has long been neglected relative to other 
transportation modes. This is partly because of the common acceptance of the myth that 
railroads can pay for themselves, even when this is rarely the case. High-speed rail initiatives 
suffer from this same lack of willingness to provide public support. Florida, for example, is 
mired in debates over how its HSR project can be funded in the absence of public monies.
In terms of the type of vision that might be provided at the federal level, at the least, 
guidance and standards for successful models are needed. Without this, states will continue 
to fill the void with a multitude of models—constitutional amendments and legislation as 
in Florida and California, multistate compacts as in the Pacific Northwest, public-private 
partnerships—without a sense of what is most likely to succeed.
More important, there is an overarching need for a national network strategy for rail—one 
that combines passenger, freight, and high-speed rail—plus a vision for how rail connects to 
and interrelates with the other transportation modes around the country and how it all 
might be funded. Otherwise, the nation will continue to miss critical opportunities for key 
linkages and enhancing efficiency, not just for high-speed rail, but also for regular passenger 
rail and freight transport.
Defining Cost
When cost-benefit analyses are developed for high-speed rail, the focus tends to be on the 
bottom line: how much money will be put in and how much will be generated. By looking 
at cost as bottom-line driven, we are unlikely to see high-speed rail implemented in the 
United States because of the large capital investment needed to build such systems. A 
broader tabulation that includes other costs borne by the transportation system and the 
public as a whole under the “no-build” or “modal alternative” options often yields different 
results.
Related to this is the need for clarity not only on the goals of the particular HSR project, 
but also on who is reaping the benefits. In Florida, the central concern has been who should 
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bear the risk for a project that is described as having a public benefit but looking for private 
dollars. The private sector would like to see the state bear more risk, while the state would 
like the private sector and the federal government to assume more risk. If there are public 
benefits to an HSR project, then arguing for only private funding makes no sense, and such 
projects are unlikely to succeed. If the public benefits are questionable, then private funding 
is a better choice.
Institutionalized Support
The spark for building HSR often has begun with a particular person in a particular state. It 
was Governor Bob Graham in Florida who visited Japan and believed Florida should have a 
similar system. In California, several legislative leaders visited Europe and Japan and 
returned with the same sentiments. While the initial vision is important for beginning an 
effort, institutionalized support is critical to sustain the effort and successfully implement 
HSR. Without institutional buy-in for a project, as well as the authority and responsibility 
to identify, gather, and manage funding, and the responsibility for and capability of seeing a 
project through, many HSR projects fail as soon as the key supporter or visionary leaves. 
Indeed, this frustration led Florida voters to approve the constitutional amendment 
requiring the building of HSR. As Florida demonstrates, a constitutional amendment or 
legislative acts alone cannot replace the need for institutionalized support because the 
former still can be challenged by successive governments or other stakeholders.
In the Pacific Northwest—the one multistate case in the study—there is some institutional 
support in the state of Washington, but that is missing in Oregon and British Columbia, 
perhaps demonstrating the need for a federal leadership role to help bridge such gaps.
Technologies and Approaches
Whether to develop a new HSR or an incremental HSR system depends greatly on what one 
hopes to accomplish and the context within which one is working. For example, if the goal 
is to increase the number of commuters using rail instead of automobile to minimize 
highway congestion, the key is to increase frequency and reliability of service, reduce travel 
times, and make the system more accessible. Such goals may be better met with an 
incremental approach that invests in station and equipment improvements, fixing curves 
and improving tracks, and enhancing signals, rather than new HSR. If the goal is to relieve 
air congestion between urban areas to free up space for more long-distance flights, a new 
HSR system linking key urban areas might be the better approach. However, such 
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discussions do not always occur; often the decision to pursue one approach or another is 
based more on political factors than on a clear assessment and explanation of what the 
specific goals are and how best to meet them.
Opportunities 
Opportunities for both incremental and new HSR exist in the United States and have for 
many years, particularly along those corridors federally designated as HSR corridors. A 
1997 Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) study on HSGT concluded that HSGT could 
develop appreciable ridership. The key is to get at least one project fully implemented in a 
way that is clearly HSR (as opposed to those that are capable of high speeds but only run at 
such speeds for small distances). Once a project is in revenue service, many of the concerns 
expressed by critics, including ridership projections and whether HSR can work in a 
country where cars and air transport are dominant, can be addressed.
6  Executive Summary
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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1960s, high-speed ground transportation (HSGT) has held the promise of fast, 
convenient, and environmentally sound travel for distances between 40 and 600 miles.1
Japan was the first to deploy HSGT in 1964 when the Shinkansen bullet train began service 
between Tokyo and Osaka, with top speeds of 270 kilometers per hour (kph) (169 miles per 
hour [mph]). This was followed in 1982 by France’s Train à Grande Vitesse (TGV), linking 
Paris and Lyon at speeds of 300 kph (188 mph), and later by Germany’s Intercity Express
(ICE) that also operates at speeds up to 300 kph (188 mph). South Korea recently began 
high-speed rail (HSR) service and Taiwan is expected to follow shortly, the former using 
French technology and the latter using Japanese bullet train technology.2
The U.S. experience with HSGT has differed greatly from that in Asia and Europe. 
Congress first authorized studies aimed at deploying HSGT with the High-Speed Ground 
Transportation Act of 1965, but to date there are only two examples of such systems in the 
United States—the Empire Corridor and Northeast Corridor—and whether these systems 
are truly high speed is debatable. Despite numerous efforts by states and the federal 
government, nearly all U.S. high-speed rail projects have failed to progress significantly, and 
none has come close to matching the performance levels of Asian and European systems.
Unlike its European and Asian counterparts, which made high-speed intercity rail a 
national priority once it became clear that railroads were either in or potentially headed for 
decline, the U.S. government has been reluctant to develop such projects. The only intercity 
rail effort moved forward by the federal government beyond pilot studies and technological 
research has been Amtrak. Ironically, the creation of Amtrak led to a stalemate regarding 
intercity passenger rail’s relationship with other transportation modes and with 
government. Since its creation, Amtrak’s relationship with other modes has been 
characterized by a division between passenger and freight rail and the isolation of the former 
from earmarked tax returns and cooperative planning and management.3 Both of these 
issues also plague HSR efforts, along with other political and financial difficulties.
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY AND SOME DEFINITIONS
The goal of this study is to identify lessons learned for successfully developing and 
implementing HSR in the United States. Phase 1 comprised a two-part literature review: an 
assessment of federal and, where warranted, state legislation to determine what was 
intended in terms of objectives and criteria identified in the legislation; and a broader 
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review that briefly assessed all HSR efforts in the United States since 1980 to determine 
their history and current status. Phase 2 comprised a deeper literature review and interviews 
to explore in more detail three case studies: California, Florida, and the Pacific Northwest. 
This report incorporates the findings from both phases of the study.
Given the early stages of these projects, this report defines success by whether a given HSR 
project is still actively pursuing development or funding. Comparisons are not made with 
European or Asian HSR models because most U.S. cases have different goals for speed, 
accessibility, and frequency. In some cases, HSR has been defined in terms of top speeds (for 
example, above 110 mph); in others, HSR definitions revolve around market penetration. 
Thus, each case is judged by how well the project has met its stated goals.
Since 1980, there have been 19 efforts to develop and deploy some form of high-speed 
ground transportation in the United States. These projects have taken different forms, both 
in terms of business models—which range from entirely public led and financed, to 
privately funded, to public-private partnership—and in the type of HSGT they have sought 
to employ:
• Incremental high-speed rail (Accelerail), which generally uses existing technologies and 
rights-of-way, but makes improvements to allow for speeds up to 150 mph (though in 
the United States, most projects aim for 110 mph) using electrified or nonelectrified 
systems.4
• New high-speed rail (HSR),5 which requires new rights-of-way and imported 
technologies currently used in Asia or Europe that typically allow speeds greater than 
200 mph.
• Magnetic levitation (Maglev), which, by doing away with steel-wheel-on-steel-rail, 
allows speeds greater than 300 mph.
Some of these projects have been formally designated by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT) as federal HSR corridors or identified under the Federal Railroad 
Administration’s Maglev program. Such identification opens the door for federal funding 
that might not be available otherwise. Other projects have been pursued without federal 
designation, although several (as in Nevada) are hoping to achieve this status. Complicating 
the situation is the fact that in some cases, states or groups of states have been pursuing 
HSGT systems that include all or part of federally designated corridors, but expand upon 
them by adding additional linkages. Table 1 lists those projects identified, along with the 
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type of HSGT being pursued and their status relative to federal designation or 
identification.
While incremental and new HSR projects differ in several ways, both the basic technologies 
and the markets they would serve are similar. Maglev is fundamentally different than HSR: 
it uses a completely different technology; it offers competitive service at a broader set of 
distances (40 to 600 miles versus 100 to 500 miles); and its federal funding sources are 
different. Because of these differences and the scope of and resources for the current study, 
the remainder of this report discusses incremental and new HSR options, but not Maglev.
Table 1 U.S. High-Speed Ground Transportation Projects as of May 2004 
Project/Corridor Federally 
Designated
Date of Initial 
Designation
HSGT Type Being 
Pursued
Atlanta–Chattanooga No -- Maglev
Baltimore, MD– 
Washington, D.C.
Maglev Deployment 
Program
1/18/01 Maglev
California Corridor Yes 10/19/92 New HSR
Chicago Hub 
Network 
Midwest Regional
Rail Initiative
Yes
No, but includes 
above
10/15/92
--
Incremental HSR
Empire Corridor Yes 10/10/98 Incremental HSR
Florida Corridor Yes 10/16/92 New HSR
Gulf Coast Corridor Yes 11/18/98 Incremental HSR
Keystone Corridor Yes 10/10/98 Incremental HSR
Nevada–Southern 
California
No -- Maglev
Northeast Corridor No -- Incremental HSR
Northern New 
England Corridor
Yes 10/11/00 Incremental HSR
Ohio & Lake Erie 
Regional Rail 
Network
No, parts in Chicago 
Hub
-- Incremental HSR
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OUTLINE OF THE REPORT
The following section provides a synopsis of HSR efforts in the United States since the 
1980s. It begins with a review and assessment of federal legislation and the goals for HSGT 
initially set forth by the U.S. DOT to provide the context within which to examine the 
various projects. A brief summary of each project in the past 20 to 25 years is provided to 
round out the three case studies.
High-Speed Rail Case Studies, on page 27, explores the California, Florida, and Pacific 
Northwest case studies in greater detail. The history of each case is discussed along with an 
assessment of why it has or has not progressed. The three cases offer an interesting mix: 
California is a new HSR project; Florida has two parallel plans, one new HSR and one 
incremental; the Pacific Northwest focuses on incremental HSR. California and Florida 
both focus on corridors within their states that could eventually be linked to corridors 
beyond their borders; the Pacific Northwest case involves more than one state, adding to 
some of the complexities. In terms of business models, California is relying on public 
funding for its project, Florida has experimented with several public-private partnership 
models, and the Pacific Northwest is partnering with Amtrak. The three cases offer some 
interesting counterpoints to each other and some broad lessons and themes for 
consideration.
Pacific Northwest 
Corridor
Yes 10/20/92 Incremental HSR
Pittsburgh Maglev Deployment 
Program
1/18/01 Maglev
South Central 
Corridor
Yes 10/11/00 Incremental HSR
Southeast Corridor
Southeastern High- 
Speed Rail
Yes
No, but includes 
above
10/20/92
--
Incremental HSR
Texas Triangle No, part in South 
Central Corridor
-- New HSR
Table 1 U.S. High-Speed Ground Transportation Projects as of May 2004 (Continued)
Project/Corridor Federally 
Designated
Date of Initial 
Designation
HSGT Type Being 
Pursued
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The report concludes with a synthesis and comparison of the lessons provided by the case 
studies as well as information gleaned from other projects around the country.
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A SYNOPSIS OF HIGH-SPEED RAIL IN THE UNITED STATES
Section 1010 of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) 
called for the selection and designation of five high-speed rail corridors around the United 
States. In October 1992, U.S. Secretary of Transportation Andrew Card, Jr., announced the 
designations of the following high-speed rail corridors: Midwest (renamed the Chicago 
Hub), Florida, California, Southeast, and the Pacific Northwest. Seven years later, Section 
1103(c) of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) authorized six 
additional corridor designations, although to date only five additional designations have 
been made: Gulf Coast, Keystone, Empire State, South Central, and Northern New 
England.
HISTORY AND STATUS OF U.S. HSR PROJECTS SINCE 1980
The case studies in the following section provide detailed information on California, 
Florida, and the Pacific Northwest, but it is instructive to briefly review the status of the 
other HSR projects in the United States. Together, they provide a sense of the difficulties 
involved with implementing HSR. The following pages provide brief descriptions and the 
status of each federally designated corridor as well as several corridors that are not federally 
designated. Where federally designated and not-federally designated systems overlap, they 
are discussed together if warranted.6
At different times, the U.S. DOT has defined HSGT both in terms of absolute speeds 
(anything over 90 mph) and in terms of markets and performance-based measurements, 
which look to total trip time savings and natural groupings of metropolitan areas.7 In most 
discussions, however, it tends toward the speed-based definition. For most HSR efforts in 
the United States, the goal has not been to replicate European or Asian HSR systems but to 
improve on what already exists.
Chicago Hub Network and the Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (2 projects/1 inclusive 
of the other)
In 1990, Illinois, Minnesota, and Wisconsin signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) aimed at evaluating the potential for a high-speed rail corridor linking Chicago, 
Milwaukee, and Minneapolis-St. Paul. One year later, TMS/Benesch High-Speed Rail 
Consultants presented their report, Tri-State High-Speed Rail Study: Chicago–Milwaukee–Twin 
Cities Corridor, to the Departments of Transportation of the three states. The purpose of the 
14  A Synopsis of High-Speed Rail in the United States
Mineta Transportation Institute
report was “to investigate the economic and financial potential for constructing and 
operating a high-speed rail system in one of two corridors…between Chicago and 
Minneapolis-St. Paul.”8 The corridors examined were a southern corridor linking Chicago, 
Milwaukee, and the Twin Cities via Madison, and a northern corridor linking the same 
cities via Green Bay. The study concluded that the southern corridor appeared “very 
promising in terms of ridership, revenues, financial, and economic benefits.”9 The report 
recommended using existing rights-of-way and targeting 125-mph service.
Formally designated a federal high-speed rail corridor on October 15, 1992, the Chicago 
Hub (formerly named the Midwest High-Speed Rail Corridor) initially included links 
between Chicago and Detroit, Chicago and St. Louis, and Chicago and Milwaukee. 
Additional linkages later were added, for a total of eight linkages covering 2,313 miles. The 
network is shown in Figure 1 and details are provided in Table 2.
Figure 1 Chicago Hub Network
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By 1994, Illinois planners had completed a study of 125-mph service for the Chicago–St. 
Louis spoke, and the second phase of a study focused on the Chicago–Milwaukee spoke 
recommended incremental nonelectric high-speed rail at 125 mph.10
In April 1997, Illinois entered into a cooperative agreement (DTFRDV-96-H-60006) with 
the U.S. DOT to perform a Tier I environmental impact study (EIS) of the Chicago–St. 
Louis spoke of the Chicago Hub Network. The total cost for the EIS was $4.469 million 
over seven years. FRA contributed $2.8 million ($2.5 million of which was provided in the 
first fiscal year of the study). This was matched with state funds totaling $1.66 million 
($1.5 million from general revenues and the remainder from state planning funds, of which 
80 percent is derived from the Federal Highway Administration.).11 The final EIS, released 
in January 2003, proposed that HSR passenger service between Chicago and St. Louis be 
implemented with a maximum operating speed of 110 mph on the section south of Dwight 
and ongoing speeds of 79 mph north of Dwight. Three different alignments were identified 
for the north-of-Dwight portion of the line, but a formal recommendation was not made 
because of funding constraints.12
Table 2 Chicago Hub Links  
City Linkages – Federally Designated Distance 
(miles)
Goal
(mph)
Date 
Designated
Chicago, IL – Detroit, MI 279 110 10/15/92
Chicago – St. Louis, MO 282 110 10/15/92
Chicago – Milwaukee, WI  
– extension to Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN
445 110 10/15/92
12/11/98
Chicago – Indianapolis, IN – Cincinnati, OH 319 110 1/28/99
Chicago – Toledo, OH – Cleveland, OH 341 110 10/11/00
Cleveland – Columbus, OH – Cincinnati (3C) 254 110 10/11/00
Indianapolis – Louisville, KY 111 79 10/11/00
St. Louis – Kansas City, MO 282 90 1/19/01
U.S. DOT, Federal Railroad Administration, “Chicago Hub Network,”www.fra.dot.gov/Content3.asp?P=648 and 
“Corridor Chronology,” www.fra.dot.gov/Content3.asp?P=1272 (accessed 18 February, 2004).
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Work has begun along the Chicago–St. Louis spoke of the Hub Network. In 1999, Illinois 
voters approved $70 million for HSR infrastructure and grade-crossing improvements along 
the Chicago–St. Louis spoke.13 Several improvements have been made to upgrade the tracks 
to allow for 110 mph speeds on the south of the Dwight–Springfield portion of the spoke. A 
Positive Train Control system14 demonstration is underway along that same spoke. The 
FRA reports grants totaling $28 million to Illinois through fiscal year 2002 under FRA’s 
Next Generation High-Speed Rail Program.15
Running parallel to the EIS efforts, nine Midwestern states (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and Wisconsin) joined to form the 
Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (MWRRI) in 1996. The goal was to develop an 
implementation plan for a more extensive HSR centered around the Chicago Hub. Totaling 
3,000 miles, the MWRRI includes the federally designated corridors in the Chicago Hub 
Network, and adds additional passenger rail links at various speeds above and below 110 
mph, as well as several feeder bus service links.
Working with Amtrak and the FRA, the MWRRI developed a report assessing the hub 
approach to the region. Their report, Midwest Regional Rail System: A Transportation Network 
for the 21st Century, issued in February 2000, concluded that completing the system 
envisioned would require a decade and approximately $4 billion in infrastructure upgrades 
and new equipment.16 The proposed Midwest regional rail system includes the Chicago 
Hub Network as designated by the FRA, but expands upon it with a number of additional 
links. The following city links are not federally designated:
• Milwaukee, WI–Green Bay, WI
• Chicago, IL–Quincy, IL
• Chicago, IL–Iowa City, IA–Des Moines, IA–Omaha, NE
• Chicago, IL–Carbondale, MO
• Kalamazoo, MI–Grand Rapids, MI–Holland, MI
• Kalamazoo, MI–Lansing, MI–Port Huron, MI
• Detroit, MI–Pontiac, MI
In 1998, the Midwestern Legislative Conference formed a High-Speed Rail Task Force. Out 
of that task force, the Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Commission (MIPRC) was formed 
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by a compact in 2000. The MIPRC works with the MWRRI, providing an advocacy arm 
for HSR in the region.
In 2002, Amtrak and the states of Illinois and Wisconsin began reviewing proposals for 
110-mph tilting HSR trains. Lack of federal funding was cited as the reason for the delay in 
concluding procurement.17 According to Amtrak, the state of Michigan, Amtrak, and the 
FRA have developed a state-of-the-art incremental train control system that permits 
passenger train operations on the existing rights-of-way at speeds up to 110 mph. The first 
phase of the system (up to 90 mph on 45 miles of track along the Chicago–Detroit spoke) 
was implemented in January 2002. Work began to extend the system an additional 
20 miles and to seek approval for operations at speeds in excess of 90 mph.18 Speeds have 
been increased to 110 mph on this section in southwest Michigan.19
With respect to the other spokes of the hub, Indiana has completed a series of high-speed 
rail public outreach meetings to define the state’s interest and participation in the MWRRI. 
Indiana is working with Amtrak, the states of Illinois and Michigan, and freight railroads 
on the South of the Lake Corridor Study to identify the best way to route passenger trains 
through southern Chicago and northwest Indiana.20 Minnesota is pursuing a $10 million 
capital budget request for preliminary engineering and environmental documentation for 
the Minnesota portion of the Chicago–Minneapolis–St. Paul Corridor.
With more than $10 million21 from the states and the FRA invested in planning, the 
Chicago Hub Network provides a success story of an incremental HSR project—or series of 
projects, in this case—by this study’s definition of success. Some work has occurred and the 
project is being actively pursued, both substantively and financially. Finding construction 
funding is a key obstacle, but the Chicago Hub Network gives a complex picture of 
federally designated and non-federally designated corridors. There also is a strong rail 
component, as the state of Illinois pursues its Chicago Regional Environmental and 
Transportation Efficiency Program (CREATE) in tandem with HSR efforts. Union Pacific, 
which owns several of the key lines, is willing to cooperate to implement HSR in the region.
Empire Corridor
Designated in December 1998 as a federal HSR corridor, the Empire Corridor connects 
New York City with Albany and Buffalo, for a total of 439 miles running through New 
York State (Figure 2). New York State has run 110-mph passenger rail service on portions of 
the Albany–New York City stretch of the Empire Corridor route since the 1970s.22 (The 
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improvements along the line that allowed higher speeds were largely financed through the 
1974 Rail Bond Act.) Speeds along the rest of the corridor are limited to 90 mph at most, in 
part because of the shared right-of-way with the Metropolitan Transportation Authority 
south of Poughkeepsie and with CSX Corporation railroad for most of the corridor between 
Poughkeepsie and Buffalo.
Figure 2 Empire Corridor, and Keystone, Northeast, and Northern New England 
Corridors
In September 1998, an MOU was signed by the New York State DOT and Amtrak that 
committed the former to rebuilding several old Turboliners and the latter to track 
improvements that would allow speeds of up to 125 mph on the section between New York 
City and Schenectady. The estimated cost of the plan was $185 million, but travel times 
were expected to be reduced significantly throughout the corridor. In January 2004, 
Amtrak announced its intention to withdraw, citing delays and increased costs.23 In the 
meantime, three Turboliners were delivered to Amtrak; two were placed in regular service 
until later in 2004, when they were taken out of service as a result of high fuel consumption 
and excessive costs.
One of the few corridors in the country where speeds of 110 mph are being achieved in 
places, the Empire Corridor is an interesting case and is considered by some to be a success 
story for incremental HSR. However, with the recent Amtrak announcement and the 
likelihood that the goal of 125 mph will not be reached soon, nor on a good portion of the 
corridor, it is unclear whether to consider this a success or failure.
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Gulf Coast Corridor
Formally designated as a federal HSR corridor in November 1998, with extensions 
approved in October 2000, the Gulf Coast Corridor (Figure 3) covers 1,022 miles and 
connects cities in Texas (Houston), Louisiana (New Orleans), Alabama (Mobile and 
Birmingham), Mississippi (Meridian), and Georgia (Atlanta).24 The goal is to run HSR at 
speeds of 110 mph. Louisiana received a $1 million earmark in Fiscal Year 1999 and 
$1.85 million was provided under TEA-21 for elimination of at-grade crossings. The lead 
for planning the corridor is the Southern Rapid Rail Transportation Commission (SRRTC), 
which includes representatives from Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.
Figure 3 Gulf Coast Corridor
In September 2002, the SRRTC was awarded a cooperative agreement by the FRA for Phase 
I of the Deep South HSR Corridor Study. In Phase I, it will identify institutional issues, 
make service projections, gather information, and develop a rail operations plan. A specific 
strategy for implementation will form the basis for Phase II.
Because funding for the study was scheduled to last through September 2004, it is likely 
that the study is not yet completed. According to the FRA, there are physical constraints 
along the CSX lines between New Orleans and Mobile that might prevent HSR for much of 
this distance.
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Keystone Corridor
The Keystone Corridor was designated as a federal HSR corridor in December 1998 (see 
Figure 2). Now consisting of 349 miles, the initial designation linked Philadelphia and 
Harrisburg, with an extension to Pittsburgh approved by the U.S. DOT in 2000. Amtrak 
owns the roughly 100 miles of track between Philadelphia and Harrisburg where current 
efforts are focused.
In November 1999, Amtrak and the State of Pennsylvania entered into an MOU and 
announced a joint $140 million infrastructure and equipment upgrade program on the 
Philadelphia–Harrisburg segment of the line to reduce trip times to 90 minutes by 2004, 
enhance stations, and improve reliability.25 In October 2003, Governor Rendell announced 
another $3 million for passenger rail service between Harrisburg and Philadelphia as part of 
a $125 million capital budget aimed at improving public transportation.26 Work continues 
on the line, although more slowly than anticipated. Roughly $20 million has been 
expended, with an anticipated $30 million in total by the end of 2004.27 Recent discussions 
with Amtrak have resulted in a verbal agreement that the remaining funding will be 
redeployed in light of a reassessment of needs on this segment of the corridor. However, the 
project is expected to continue, with a completion date of December 2006.
Another example of an incremental HSR project within one state, efforts continue on this 
line, although it appears to have some difficulties similar to the Empire Corridor in terms of 
Amtrak’s role.
Northeast Corridor
Although not formally designated as a federal corridor, the Northeast Corridor (see Figure 
2) is one of the few U.S. success stories in HSR; however, its key successes in terms of speed 
came by the early 1970s and there has been little improvement since. As Perl notes, 
however, while HSR in the Northeast Corridor did not keep pace with the speed and 
reliability of European and Asian efforts, it did keep pace with respect to commercial 
performance by covering costs and generating an operating profit.28
In 1967, following the High-Speed Ground Transportation Act two years prior, the Office 
of HSGT at the U.S. DOT committed $6.7 million to support Pennsylvania Railroad’s 
acquisition of new passenger cars that could attain speeds up to 160 mph.29 The goal was to 
shorten the trip between New York City and Washington, D.C., to less than three hours. 
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What made the Northeast Corridor so marketable was a combination of economic and 
geographic circumstances. Because the Northeast Corridor lacked the space to add the 
highway and air capacity needed to match growing travel demands, it was a good candidate 
for enhancing existing infrastructure. The corridor had a well-developed and modern rail 
infrastructure when the decision was made, and Pennsylvania Railroad, which owned and 
operated the line between New York City and Washington, D.C., was willing to work with 
the government on the initiative.30
This was a true private-public enterprise: Private partners put approximately $860 million 
into the project, with only about $13 million from government sources. The key 
manufacturing companies—GE, Westinghouse, and the Budd Company—were all U.S. 
based. The partners had the Metroliner HSR system up and running within four years. 
However, because the long-term goal of upgrading the tracks to accommodate the higher 
speeds was not yet met, the trains could only run at speeds as high as 120 mph.
The partnership ended when Penn Central filed for bankruptcy in 1970, with other 
railroads following soon after. Amtrak took over operation of the Metroliner between New 
York City and Washington, D.C., between 1978 and 1999; FRA invested about 
$3.7 billion in rehabilitating and upgrading the corridor. In 1992, Amtrak initiated the 
Acela HSR program and has invested $1.8 billion to date in a system that could run at 
speeds of 150 mph. Work focused especially on the New York City–Boston segment of the 
corridor, rebuilding infrastructure and fully electrifying the line to Boston from New 
Haven, Connecticut.31
Revenue service of the Acela began in December 2000 and trains now operate between 110 
and 150 mph on parts of the corridor. However, in more than 30 years, except for the 
introduction of the Acela, little has changed on the southern section of the corridor in terms 
of speed and number of trains making the trip on a daily basis, even as the airlines have 
modified their schedules to accommodate more passengers and more trips. This corridor is 
considered a success because the system has been operating at HSR speeds for several 
decades, although the ultimate goal has not yet been achieved on much of the line.
Northern New England Corridor
One of the newest of the federally designated corridors, the Northern New England 
Corridor was formally designated in October 2000 (see Figure 2). Shaped like a lopsided V, 
the 489-mile corridor connects Boston with Portland and Auburn, Maine, on one side and 
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connects Boston with Montreal, Canada, on the other. Current speeds on the section from 
Boston to Portland (which began being serviced by Amtrak in December 2001) average 
only 59 mph. In January 2002, a meeting was held in Nashua, New Hampshire, to begin a 
Boston–Montreal high-speed rail feasibility study, jointly funded by the FRA and the 
Departments of Transportation of Massachusetts, Vermont, and New Hampshire. The 
study’s first phase, which focuses on ridership forecasts, infrastructure, public participation, 
and institutional issues, was scheduled for completion in September 2002, but has not yet 
been released.
Ohio and Lake Erie Regional Rail Network
In 1975, the Ohio Rail Transportation Authority (ORTA) was created and charged with 
creating a plan for an intrastate passenger rail system that could be brought to the voters for 
support, and with promoting a sound and efficient freight rail system. In 1979, ORTA 
recommended incremental HSR as the most viable option because it could be implemented 
at speeds up to 150 mph in a relatively short time. Within a few years, however, they had 
shifted to advocating a new HSR system, thinking that construction of such a system would 
also generate jobs in a state experiencing an economic downturn. In 1982, the ORTA 
proposal was defeated at the polls.
ORTA’s responsibilities were shifted to the Ohio Department of Transportation’s (ODOT) 
Rail Division in 1983, and an Ohio High-Speed Rail Authority was created in 1985 to 
assist in developing a statewide rail plan, including HSR. The latter was terminated in 
1989. Five years later, the Ohio Rail Development Commission (ORDC) was established by 
the legislature as part of ODOT. Consistent with earlier Ohio policy on rail, the ORDC was 
charged with addressing all rail issues, including passenger and freight.
In 1997, the ORDC began another serious look at HSR. They actively pursued federal 
designation of the 3-Cs (Cleveland–Columbus–Cincinnati) Corridor as part of the Chicago 
Hub Network and actively participated in the Midwest Regional Rail System. The ORDC 
and ODOT also identified several other corridors for further investigation and continue to 
seek federal HSR designation.
In 2001, the ORDC requested funds from the state for a study of the Detroit–Pittsburgh 
section of what they are calling the Cleveland Hub (see Figure 4 from the Ohio Rail 
Development Commission Website, http://www.dot.state.oh.us/ohiorail/CleveHub%20 
Map.htm). ODOT and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) approved funding, 
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although at the time of this report it appears that study is not yet completed. ODOT has 
also been working on a study with the Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) on 
the Detroit–Toledo line. 
Figure 4 Ohio and Lake Erie Regional Rail: Cleveland Hub
The remainder of the corridors remain unassessed with respect to their feasibility for HSR.32 
The following ORDC corridors are not federally designated:
• Toledo, OH–Detroit, MI
• Cleveland, OH–Pittsburgh, PA
• Cleveland, OH–Erie, NY–Buffalo, NY–Niagara Falls, NY–Toronto, Canada
• Toledo, OH–Columbus, OH
• Chicago, IL–Ft. Wayne, IN–Lima, OH–Columbus, OH
• Columbus, OH–Pittsburgh, PA
South Central Corridor
The South Central Corridor was designated a federal corridor in October 2000. Shaped like 
a Y, it connects San Antonio, Texas, to Tulsa, Oklahoma, via Austin, Dallas/Fort Worth and 
Oklahoma City on one fork, and San Antonio to Little Rock, Arkansas, via Austin, Dallas/
Fort Worth, and Texarkana on the other. The entire system covers 994 miles. Nothing 
appears to have moved forward in this corridor.
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Southeast Corridor and Southeastern High-Speed Rail (2 projects: 1 inclusive of the 
other)
Designated as a federal corridor in October 1992, the initial Southeast Corridor linked 
Washington, D.C., to Richmond, Virginia. In 1995, an extension was approved to 
Hampton Roads, Virginia, with additional extensions approved in December 1998 and 
October 2000 (Figure 5).
Figure 5 Southeast Corridor
The current corridor links Washington, D.C., with five states and the Gulf Coast Corridor 
in the following segments:
• Washington, D.C.–Richmond, VA
• Richmond, VA–Hampton Roads, VA
• Richmond, VA–Raleigh, NC–Greensboro, NC–Charlotte, NC
• Raleigh, NC–Columbia, SC–Savannah, GA–Jacksonville, FL
• Atlanta, GA–Macon, GA
• Charlotte, NC–Atlanta, GA
Southeastern High-Speed Rail includes the federally designated corridor, but extends the 
links to include the segment to Birmingham, Alabama, covered by the Gulf Coast federally 
designated corridor and an additional segment to Chattanooga and Nashville, Tennessee.33
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A report issued in 1997 by the U.S. DOT identified the Southeast Corridor as the most 
economically viable of all the proposed HSR projects.34 One year later, the Virginia 
Department of Rail and Public Transport, North Carolina’s Department of Transportation, 
the FRA, and the FHWA signed an MOU to jointly develop environmental documentation 
related to implementing HSR on the portions of the corridor in Virginia and North 
Carolina. A Tier I EIS followed in 1999, focused on the Washington, D.C.–Charlotte 
segment of the corridor. The Tier I EIS was completed in 2002 and a Record of Decision on 
the proposed route was issued by the FRA and FHWA, allowing the Tier II EIS to begin. 
The proposed date of completion was 2004.
Texas Triangle
Linking the cities of Dallas and Houston, Dallas and San Antonio, and San Antonio and 
Houston, the Texas Triangle is not a federally designated corridor, although parts of it are 
included in the federally designated South Central Corridor. Efforts began in 1987 when the 
Texas Legislature directed the Texas Turnpike Authority to study the feasibility of HSR in 
the Texas Triangle. In 1989, a report was made to the legislature concluding that under 
certain assumptions, HSR would be feasible. In May 1989, the Texas High-Speed Rail Act 
created the 11-member Texas High-Speed Rail Authority (THSRA). It was charged with 
determining if HSR was in the public interest and, if so, awarding a franchise to develop 
and operate such a system. In 1990, requests for letters of intent and then a request for 
proposals were issued, with proposals received the following year from the Texas High-
Speed Rail Joint Venture (later Texas FasTrac) and the Texas TGV Consortium. The latter 
was awarded the franchise to build, operate, and maintain an HSR system in the triangle.
Initially, the Texas TGV Consortium expected a more streamlined process with fewer 
constraints because there was to be no public funding for the project. It quickly became 
clear that there were major hurdles to overcome. In the franchise agreement, Texas TGV 
agreed to pay for THSRA’s ongoing operating budget and to obtain $170 million in equity 
financing by the end of 1992. Because of new safety regulations under the FRA, a complete 
EIS would need to be prepared, including public hearings, all at Texas TGV’s expense.35
The initial 1992 deadline was missed and extended for an additional year. The financing 
deadline was missed again in 1993, and by 1994 the contract had been terminated. Part of 
the difficulty in obtaining funding was directly related to Southwest Airlines’ aggressive 
countercampaign, which launched several lawsuits during this period and allied with key 
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partners to block congressional funding in an effort to stop what they saw as a competitor 
for their customers.
Texas TGV’s investors lost about $40 million by the end of the process.36 More importantly, 
according to Perl, “The Texas TGV’s failure was a delegitimizing event for the proponents 
of market-led rail passenger renewal.”37 The Texas Triangle is a clear example of a failure, as 
they are no longer actively pursuing funding or development.
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HIGH-SPEED RAIL CASE STUDIES
The following three case studies were selected for further review based on the potential for 
some demonstrable lessons learned or themes for consideration that would be relevant to 
other projects around the country. These three studies offer interesting counterpoints: 
California is pressing for a new HSR system; the Pacific Northwest case focuses on 
incremental HSR; and Florida has two plans—one for new HSR and one for an incremental 
system. In Florida and California, voters are heavily involved and, in some ways, leading 
HSR efforts, while the Pacific Northwest case is led primarily by state agencies. The Pacific 
Northwest demonstrates the difficulties of multistate efforts, while California and Florida 
are testaments to the fact that single-state efforts also often meet with difficulty. Finally, 
while California to a large degree and the Pacific Northwest to a smaller degree have a 
history of reliance on rail and public transit systems, Florida has for many years been focused 
on the automobile and highways, adding to the difficulty of implementing HSR.
FLORIDA
Not clearly a success or a failure at this point, Florida’s intercity passenger rail plan is an 
interesting case in dealing with high-speed rail. Florida’s experience with HSR dates back 
more than 30 years, including several starts and stops and multiple plans and pieces of 
legislation. The current project plan focuses on building a new HSR system along a 92-mile 
stretch connecting Tampa and Orlando (Figure 6). A Draft Environmental Impact 
Statement (DEIS) has been completed as part of the Project Development and 
Environmental (PD&E) Process, preferred alignments have been identified, and the Florida 
High-Speed Rail Authority (FHSRA) has executed a contract with Fluor-Bombardier to 
provide professional services to complete the final EIS. A Record of Decision on the final 
EIS by the U.S. Federal Railroad Administration is pending,
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Figure 6 Florida Corridor
All this activity is occurring against the backdrop of an intense and extremely divisive 
political debate within a state that is historically dependent on the automobile, with little 
commuter rail or transit, and an antitax culture. In 2000, a constitutional amendment, 
conceived and spearheaded by Florida citizens, was approved by voters, requiring the state 
to build a high-speed ground transportation system. Governor Jeb Bush (R, 1999–present), 
who curtailed an earlier HSR project when he took office, helped lead an effort to stop the 
current plans. Unable to get bills passed through the state House and Senate, he turned to 
the voters to gain enough signatures to place a measure on the November 2004 ballot to 
repeal the 2000 amendment. That amendment was repealed on November 2, 2004, with 
63.7 percent of the vote in favor of repealing it.38 Before the repeal of the amendment was 
definite, the Florida legislature cut all state funding for high-speed rail, citing the 
likelihood of veto by Bush.39
The public debate in Florida focuses on cost and marketability. Those opposed to building 
HSR in Florida argue that the costs are too high, the state is being asked to shoulder an 
undue burden, and contributing funds for HSR will reduce monies needed for other 
transportation programs, in particular, highway projects. Those pressing for HSR cite 
growing population pressures and transportation capacity needs that require an intermodal 
approach that links Florida’s urban areas. They also argue that funds have been set aside for 
HSR within the Florida Department of Transportation, so an HSR project should not be a 
drain on other transportation programs, and that costs would be far outweighed by the 
economic benefits HSR would bring over the life of the project.
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The Florida case also may provide lessons on other contextual issues. For example, while 
projected cost is an important rallying point for both sides of the debate, there are two more 
fundamental issues related to this that go beyond the immediate debate: 
• the role of public investment in intercity passenger rail, and the unwillingness of 
government to subsidize this transportation mode as it does others
• defining cost as purely monetary costs rather than a broader definition that includes 
environmental costs, societal costs, energy costs, and so on.
Florida also provides insight about the effect of the type of project being pursued. The 
current debate relates to new HSR, but some people prefer an incremental solution, 
believing that would help prove HSR marketability without the financial risks of a new 
system. Why new HSR was chosen over an incremental approach and how that decision has 
affected the likelihood of a successful outcome is relevant for other projects. The role of the 
state legislature and the importance of the constitutional amendment also will be examined 
to see how they affected the likelihood of successfully implementing HSR in the state.
A History of HSR in Florida
The history of HSR in Florida covers three decades of multiple starts and stops, numerous 
corridor studies and proposals, and millions of dollars in investments, yet still no HSR. In 
1976, the Florida legislature mandated the Florida Transit Corridor Study to determine the 
feasibility of HSR between Daytona Beach and St. Petersburg. The study concluded that, if 
implemented in stages using existing highway corridors, HSR would be marketable in 
Florida. The study proposed using existing rail corridors and the possibility of locating 
HSR within limited access highway medians, an idea with which the Florida Department of 
Transportation (FDOT) agreed.40
Six years later, Governor Bob Graham (D, 1979–1987) visited Japan and traveled on the 
Shinkansen. He returned to Florida a strong supporter of HSR and authorized the creation of 
the Florida High-Speed Rail Committee (FHSRC) as a first step toward creating such a 
system in his state. In 1984, the committee released the Florida Future Advanced 
Transportation Report, which concluded that Florida’s transportation infrastructure could not 
accommodate future growth and that an advanced HSR system was necessary to 
maintaining mobility in the state. The report recommended developing public-private 
partnerships and using existing publicly owned rights-of-way (ROWs). During that same 
year, Florida’s legislature enacted the Florida High-Speed Rail Transportation Commission 
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Act, which created the seven-member Florida High-Speed Rail Commission (FHSRC) and 
authorized it to grant a franchise to build a privately funded and operated high-speed rail 
network serving Miami, Tampa, and Orlando.
In 1986, the HSR Commission released its own study by Barton Aschman Associates that 
recommended proceeding with a 356-mile HSR system connecting Miami, Orlando, and 
Tampa. Requests for proposals were issued; two were received in 1988, one from Florida 
TGV, Inc., and one from Florida High-Speed Rail Corporation. The former proposed using 
French TGV trains, which could run at speeds of 170 mph. The estimated cost of building 
the system was $2.2 billion, with ridership projections of 5.9 million annually.41 The latter 
proposed using Swedish-built ABBX2000 trains with tilt technologies that could run at 
speeds of 150 mph. Estimated costs were $1.9 billion, with projected ridership at 3.7 
million annually.42 Both proposals assumed some public spending and/or real estate 
development rights, but when it was clear that there would be no support for public 
funding, Florida TGV, Inc., withdrew. Florida High-Speed Rail Corporation submitted a 
revised proposal in 1990 that proposed financing the project with a combination of tax 
increment financing, benefit districts, impact fees, and a new gas tax. One year later, 
Governor Lawton Chiles (D, 1991–1998) rejected the proposal, citing high costs.
Despite the lack of support in the governor’s office, the legislature enacted a new High-
Speed Rail Act in 1992, transferring the FHSRC’s responsibilities to FDOT. FDOT also was 
charged with providing an updated rail system plan every other year that incorporated both 
passenger and freight components. That same year, on October 16, the Miami–Orlando–
Tampa Corridor was federally designated as a high-speed rail corridor by the U.S. 
Department of Transportation, allowing the possibility of federal funds for studies.
During the next two years, more corridor studies were conducted by FDOT to evaluate the 
feasibility of a network of HSR corridors connecting major cities around the state. Based on 
the findings of these studies, FDOT announced its commitment to fund HSR, setting aside 
$70 million per year, plus a 4 percent inflation adjustment, for at least 30 years. The funds 
would service infrastructure bonds using a portion of Florida’s gasoline tax that had been 
earmarked for nonhighway expenditures.43 As Perl points out, “such a dowry, while small in 
relation to the level of government support routinely extended to air or road infrastructure, 
made Florida’s planned high-speed rail development far more attractive to private industry 
than prospects in other states.”44 This was evidenced by the response to FDOT’s 1995 
request for proposals. Five proposals were submitted, offering a range of public-private 
options for the Miami–Tampa–Orlando corridor, including plans aimed at incremental 
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improvements, new high-speed rail using bullet trains, and two proposals for Maglev 
technologies. Cost estimates on the proposals ranged from a low of $740 million to a high of 
$20 billion.45
The Florida Overland eXpress Project
After evaluating the proposals, FDOT selected the Florida Overland eXpress (FOX) 
Consortium, comprising Fluor Daniel Corporation, Odebrecht-Campanhia Brasileira de 
Projectos e Obras, Bombardier, GEC-Alsthom, Bear Stearns, Banque Nationale de Paris, 
and several consulting groups. FOX proposed to build and operate a new grade-separated, 
fully dedicated HSR serving the three cities at an estimated capital cost of $6.1 billion. The 
rationale for a new HSR system instead of an incremental approach stemmed from the goals 
laid out in the request for proposals (RFP) and the belief that if the critical goal were to 
move people from point A to point B quickly and efficiently, a dedicated ROW was 
necessary.46 FOX officials felt strongly that sharing tracks through an incremental approach 
would never allow the speeds and frequency of service of a dedicated ROW.
Like the earlier proposal from Florida TGV, Inc., FOX planned to use French TGV 
technology for its rolling stock. Although other technologies were available, the selection of 
the TGV was aimed at minimizing risk, particularly in the eyes of the financial industry. 
Because HSR did not exist in the United States, it was (and still is) considered a high-risk 
venture; using a proven technology could at least mitigate risk on the technological side. In 
revenue service since 1981, the TGV had demonstrated the fastest trip times, the most 
reliability, and the best safety record of the potential technologies available.47 (It should be 
noted that evolving FRA safety standards would have required changes to conventional 
TGV technology for high-speed operation in the United States.)
Envisioned as a private-public partnership, franchise and precertification agreements were 
executed in 1997, with the understanding that FDOT would provide $70 million per year 
(escalated at 4 percent per year) for 30 to 40 years. Using a portion of Florida’s gasoline tax 
revenues, a percentage of which had been earmarked for nonhighway-related expenditures, 
these funds would be used to service infrastructure bonds. FOX would contribute 
$349 million in equity funds over the construction period to capitalize FOX.48 Although a 
significant amount of money, the $349 million only accounted for 4 percent of the total 
projected costs, estimated at up to $9.3 billion total.49 (Private investment was set at 
$349 million because of a state cap on the private equity share that demanded a high return 
of investment, making it less expensive to use public funds.50) The remainder of the costs 
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would be financed through debt financing and bonds, repaid by revenues and a portion of 
the annual state contributions, although $2 billion in federal loans through the 
Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) were also sought 
(Figure 7).51
Figure 7 Sources of Funding for the FOX Project
This last point has been a continuous source of contention because it is not just unclear, but 
also unlikely, that federal support would be provided for HSR at the levels needed.
FDOT viewed the project as playing a key role in an integrated transportation system that 
would link various modes and meet the travel needs of tourists and residents, while being 
environmentally and fiscally responsible.52 Studies undertaken by Tim Lynch at Florida 
State University’s Center for Economic Forecasting and Analysis and by Steven Polzin at the 
University of South Florida’s Center for Urban Transportation Research, provided a detailed 
description of the need for and projected impacts of the FOX HSR project.
Regarding the need for an HSR project, Lynch and Polzin noted that Florida’s population 
grew by 91 percent between 1970 and 1990, and they projected an additional increase of 
38 percent by 2010. Tourism was projected to increase by 82 percent during that same 
period. Increased numbers of residents and tourists was expected to create a tremendous 
increase in demand for highway capacity that would exceed the projected 18 percent 
increase in highway lane miles through 2010.53 Thus, an alternate mode was necessary and 
Lynch and Polzin went so far as defining HSR as “one of several pivotal transportation 
investments needed....”54
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Lynch and Polzin noted several benefits of HSR connecting Miami, Tampa, and Orlando:
• 1.4 million fewer auto trips by 2010
• 60,000 fewer airport flights by 2010
• $1.667 billion (1997 dollars) per year of increased economic activity during the four 
peak construction years
• 80 pounds fewer pollutants per person for any traveler who shifted mode to HSR by 
2010
• Reduced energy consumption equivalent to 4.7 gallons of gasoline per person who 
shifted mode 55
Bolstered by these findings and FDOT’s support, FOX began its preliminary engineering 
and environmental work in 1998. Opponents quickly sprang up, questioning everything 
from costs and environmental issues to the use of imported technology. A grassroots 
campaign called Derail the Bullet Train actively campaigned against FOX, suggesting that 
the new HSR project would lead to “an ineffective use of public money.” State Senator Ron 
Klein (D-District 30, Palm Beach), founder of Derail the Bullet Train, said that public 
transportation was and continues to be underdeveloped in Florida and, given the costs 
involved, he and many others would rather see such funds used toward regional forms of 
public transportation than intercity HSR.56
Others began poking holes in FOX’s ridership projections and revenue estimates, often 
arguing that the United States was unlikely to follow European and Asian experiences with 
HSR. Although FOX’s ridership study was said to have included “a more intense review and 
detailed ridership study than anywhere else in the world”57 at that time, many were 
skeptical because there was no HSR in the United States. For example, FOX assumed that 
some airlines would agree to code-share agreements so travelers could easily transfer from 
planes flying into the cities onto HSR, as was done in Europe. However, an independent 
report in 1998 by Wilbur Smith Associates, commissioned by the Florida Transportation 
Commission, which oversees FDOT, concluded that the assumption was unverified in the 
United States. (The fact that U.S. airlines have not been quick to support HSR, and in 
several cases—most notably Texas—have openly opposed it, suggests that the assumption 
should be questioned.) FOX also assumed that some air passengers would choose HSR over 
air because of lower fares. However, the report stated that in many cases, air fares were 
already much lower than FOX projections. (In a letter from C.C. Dockery to Senator Toni 
Jenning, Dockery refutes these claims, demonstrating that the FOX fares were significantly 
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lower than the air fares at the time.58) It also was assumed that more than 50 percent of the 
riders would be automobile drivers who would shift mode, something that Wilbur Smith 
Associates again argued was unproven in the United States, and particularly in a state like 
Florida, which relies extensively on the automobile. Many people thought that FOX’s 
ridership and revenue projections were too optimistic in an environment in which HSR was 
unproven.59
Shortly thereafter, U.S. House Budget Committee Chair John Kasich (R-Ohio) asked the 
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) to review FOX’s proposal. The GAO’s 1999 report 
noted that because it was in the early phases of development, the FOX project faced “several 
uncertainties regarding its cost, ridership, and schedule…. It will be at least 2 more years 
before sufficient information is available to comprehensively assess the project.”60 The GAO 
warned that investing in FOX could constrain other Transportation Infrastructure Finance 
and Innovation Act (TIFIA) allocations. The report stated that “the FOX project could 
require a substantial portion of TIFIA’s total 5-year funding.” It further noted that at least 
31 projects nationwide would be eligible for TIFIA funds and that “limited TIFIA funds 
would be available for these projects if the Department decides to provide FOX with a $2 
billion loan.”61
The report had a strong chilling effect, especially among potential investors, and lent 
further credence to concerns over the ability to secure federal funding for the project. Upon 
taking office in January 1999, Governor Bush terminated funding (as Governor Chiles had 
eight years earlier), citing both environmental and financial concerns and the uncertainties 
identified in the GAO report. The funding that would have been used for HSR was 
redirected toward highway and aviation projects, dealing a devastating blow to HSR.
In the Wake of FOX’s Demise: A Vision for Incremental HSR
In May 2000, Amtrak and FDOT issued the joint Florida Intercity Passenger Service Rail Vision 
Plan. It took a different approach to HSR, focusing on incremental rather than new HSR, 
and posited a business model partnering the State of Florida and Amtrak. When asked 
about this shift, Nazih Haddad, Manager of Passenger Rail Development at FDOT, 
explained that with the failure of FOX, FDOT felt it needed to do something because an 
alternative to highways was still needed with demand for capacity continuing to increase. 
He noted that incremental HSR made sense because “the bottom line issues of frequency of 
service and travel time are more important than actual speed.”62
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An incremental approach to HSR in Florida has advocates. Al Harper, Chairman of EWM 
Realtors, believes that new HSR may be “too expensive for what Florida ought to do right 
now.” The competitiveness of the first leg of the system (Tampa–Orlando) is questionable 
given that it is an 80-minute trip by car, and by rail it would be reduced only about 10 
minutes.63 He argues that an incremental approach could be put in place faster, at a lesser 
cost, and could help prove the marketability needed to expand the system further.64
Harper’s thoughts are echoed by Bob Vander Clute, Senior Vice President of Safety and 
Operations at the Association of American Railroads. He notes that incremental HSR can 
begin with existing ROWs and structures, saving both cost and time so people need not 
wait many years to see progress—something quite important in a highly charged political 
environment. While incremental rail will never achieve the speeds of new HSR, much can 
still be done in terms of eliminating highway grade crossings, straightening curves, and 
deploying supplementary signalization systems so that faster times and increased frequency 
can be achieved and further built upon later.65
Citing the figures provided by Lynch and Polzin several years earlier, the Vision Plan noted 
that further highway and air expansion to meet projected travel demand would face major 
economic and environmental challenges. Although the FOX project was not implemented, 
the benefits of rail were recognized by FDOT. The Vision Plan connected major urban 
centers, tourist attractions, and intermodal transportation centers with the following 
objectives:
• Delivery of quality, corridor-focused rail service quickly, implementing initial service 
improvements by 2003
• Provision of continuous program improvement thereafter, including market 
development, service quality, and network expansion
• Implementation of the program cost effectively and affordably, while minimizing and 
managing financial, market, technological, and environmental risks
• Use of a wide range of partnerships to maximize customer and stakeholder support66
The Vision Plan identified two planning periods. The first would cover five years and 
include immediate actions that could “…initiate quality passenger rail service in high-
demand travel markets quickly with minimal capital investment.”67 The second period 
would run 20 years, at the end of which Florida would have a well-integrated passenger rail 
system serving communities throughout the state.
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The Vision Plan chose the Miami–Tampa–Orlando Corridor as the best one in which to 
begin, noting that it was already served by an existing rail line, the distance between 
endpoint stations was between 75 and 300 miles (making rail competitive with air and 
automobile),68 and it had the largest current and projected markets. Working within 
Amtrak’s Network Growth Strategy, which had assessed the potential for connecting the 
national network to additional corridor service in partnership with states, the Vision Plan 
laid out its 20-year strategy, as shown in Table 3.
Table 3 Florida DOT’s Strategy for Incremental HSR 
Phase — to Be 
Implemented by
Infrastructure and Service Modifications Results
1 —2002–2003 Restructure long-distance passenger service 
along lines included in its Network Growth 
Strategy, mainly the Silver Star, Silver Meteor, and 
Silver Palm services.
Provide direct service between Jacksonville and 
Miami along Florida East Coast Railway (FEC).
Add more service between Tampa and 
Jacksonville and new service between Orlando 
and Tampa.
Increased service along 
sections of the route.
Reduced travel time 
between Miami and 
Jacksonville; no time 
saved on other routes.
Trains still limited to 
79 mph.
2 — 2005 Introduce new intercity trains between Miami 
and Orlando, Tampa and Orlando, and Tampa 
and Miami along existing CSX ROWs.
Improvements to reduce bottlenecks and increase 
safety.
Increased service along 
sections of the route.
Trains still limited to 
79 mph, but new 
rolling stock capable of 
110 mph, with multiple 
amenities.
3 — 2015 New service between Orlando and Port 
Canaveral on a new line between Jacksonville and 
Orlando.
Increase service between Miami and Orlando 
along FEC.
Add stations.
Speeds increased to 
110 mph in certain 
corridors.
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Initial financing would be through joint investment by FDOT and Amtrak, with each 
sharing initial capital costs (estimated at $278 to $393 million) equally.69 As shown in 
Table 4, the Vision Plan anticipates immediate benefits within the first five years (Phase 1 
and Phase 2) in terms of frequency of service.
The Vision Plan remains in place and has some support, but many in Florida are skeptical of 
incremental HSR. Advocates of new HSR, like Eugene Skoropowski, Managing Director, 
Capitol Corridor Joint Powers Authority, BART, note that although passenger trains can be 
run along existing tracks, there is a basic incompatibility above 80 mph because of 
operations and safety issues. He also states that both new and incremental HSR can work, 
but what can be achieved with each of them is different.70 (Interestingly, this theme is 
repeated on both sides of the debate.) C.C. Dockery is even more emphatic in his concerns 
that incremental HSR is not the right approach, arguing that it will never work if freight 
4 — 2020 Construct a new line between Naples and Fort 
Lauderdale.
Add service between Jacksonville and Pensacola.
Connect Tampa to St. Petersburg.
Fully integrated system 
crossing the state.
Florida Department of Transportation, Florida Intercity Passenger Rail Service Vision Plan—Executive Summary (1 
May 2000).
Table 4 2000 and Proposed Year 2005 Intercity Rail Daily Round Trips
Markets 2000 Amtrak 
Service
Proposed 2005 Service
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Tampa–Orlando 0 2 6 8
Miami–Orlando 2 1 4 5
Tampa–Miami 1 1 1 2
Jacksonville–Orlando 2 3 0 3
Jacksonville–Tampa 1 3 0 3
Jacksonville–Miami 3 3 0 3
Table 3 Florida DOT’s Strategy for Incremental HSR (Continued)
Phase — to Be 
Implemented by
Infrastructure and Service Modifications Results
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rail controls the tracks because freight is in business to profit from freight, not to service 
tracks for passenger rail.71 Others point out that although an incremental approach may be 
cheaper, it is still not cheap, and the issue of funding and public investment still need to be 
resolved. Finally, as Senator Klein points out, finding political support for incremental rail 
remains difficult because one still needs to make the case for a statewide benefit. With 
either this approach or with new HSR built in segments (for example, Tampa–Orlando first, 
then Miami, then other cities), many people do not see initial benefits where they live or 
work and wonder if they will see a benefit to their region, given the costs and time 
involved.72
Renewed Attempts to Implement New HSR—The Constitutional Amendment and the 
Fluor-Bombardier Project
While FDOT was developing and releasing its Vision Plan, a parallel effort aimed at 
implementing new HSR was still underway, led in large part by Dockery, a Florida citizen 
who had been involved with HSR since the late 1970s. A firm believer in the need for new 
HSR in Florida and a board member of the FHSRA, Dockery initially had been involved 
with the issue as an observer as his friend and colleague, Governor Graham, pressed for it. 
Dockery then worked with the campaign of Governor Bob Martinez (R, 1987–1991) and 
was appointed by the latter to the Florida High-Speed Rail Commission, of which he 
eventually became chairman, until it was abolished by Governor Chiles. In 2000, the 
Florida legislature authorized another feasibility study, initially titled the Coast-to-Coast Rail 
Feasibility Study and later renamed the Cross-State Rail Feasibility Study, to be conducted by 
STV, Inc. At the same time, the legislature asked voters to decide on a constitutional 
amendment, drafted by Dockery, that directed the legislature to develop and operate a high-
speed ground transportation system, with speeds above 120 mph and with construction 
beginning on or before November 1, 2003.
The amendment to the Constitution passed with 52.7 percent of the popular vote, although 
regional differences existed: On a county-by-county basis, 30 counties voted in favor and 37 
against the amendment.73 Article X, Section 19 stipulated that:
To reduce traffic congestion and provide alternatives to the traveling public, 
it is hereby declared to be in the public interest that a high speed ground 
transportation system consisting of a monorail, fixed guideway or magnetic 
levitation system, capable of speeds in excess of 120 miles per hour, be 
developed and operated in the State of Florida to provide high speed ground 
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transportation by innovative, efficient and effective technologies consisting of 
dedicated rails or guideways separated from motor vehicular traffic that will 
link the five largest urban areas of the State as determined by the Legislature 
and provide for access to existing air and ground transportation facilities and 
services. The Legislature, the Cabinet and the Governor are hereby directed 
to proceed with the development of such a system by the State and/or by a 
private entity pursuant to state approval and authorization, including the 
acquisition of right-of-way, the financing of design and construction of the 
system, and the operation of the system, as provided by specific appropriation 
and by law, with construction to begin on or before November 1, 2003.74
The legislature enacted the Florida High-Speed Rail Authority Act, creating the Florida 
High-Speed Rail Authority (FHSRA) in June 2001. Composed of a nine-member board, 
with three appointees each from the governor, the Senate, and the House, the FHSRA was 
charged with locating, planning, designing, financing, constructing, maintaining, owning, 
operating, administering, and managing HSR in the state. It was further authorized to 
“seek and obtain federal matching funds or any other funds to fulfill the requirements of 
this act either directly or through the Department of Transportation.”75 It appeared that 
progress was again being made.
That same month STV, Inc., submitted its final coast-to-coast report to FDOT, providing an 
assessment of route and technology alternatives, estimated costs, and ridership potentials for 
an HSR corridor linking St. Petersburg, Tampa, and Orlando. The report’s final 
recommendation was to move ahead with what was considered the Minimum Operable 
Segment (MOS) required for a successful system startup, that is a nonelectrified high-speed 
technology operating at speeds of up to 150 mph, connecting Orlando and Tampa along the 
Interstate 4 alignment. The end points in each city would be Orlando International Airport 
and Tampa Union Station, with intermediate station stops at Disney World, the Orange 
County Convention Center, and Lakeland. STV recommended “no more planning studies,” 
and the authors of the report strongly urged that “the State not engage in another planning 
study in order to create the perception of moving forward.” In their words, “It is now time 
to begin the more refined engineering and environmental analyses that will move this 
project forward in the event that federal funding is secured for implementation.”76 The 
study also recommended that preliminary engineering and environmental work activities 
start and an investment-grade ridership study be developed. The FHSRA proceeded 
accordingly, initiating a Project, Development, and Environment (PD&E) Study in late 
2001 for Phase 1, Part 1 of Florida’s HSR system. (Phase 1, Part 2 would extend the line 
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from Tampa to St. Petersburg; Phase 2 would be the final extension between Orlando and 
Miami.)
The first report of the FHSRA to the governor was made in 2002. Later that year (on 
October 7), the FHSRA issued a request for proposals for the design, build, operation, 
maintenance, and finance (DBOM&F) of a high-speed ground transportation system for 
Phase 1, Part 1 of an HSR system from Tampa to Orlando.77 Around that same time, the 
FHSRA also released several documents as part of the PD&E Study, including the Florida 
High-Speed Rail: Screening Report, prepared by Parsons PBS&J (October 2002) and the 
Investment Grade Ridership Study, prepared by AECOM Consulting and Wilbur Smith 
Associates (November 2002). The former documented the initial decision-making process 
used to determine which segments within the potential corridors between Orlando and 
Tampa would be moved forward for further analysis. It also reviewed the need, purpose, and 
markets for HSR in Florida, noting the following in particular:
• Tourist travel—studies consistently demonstrated that visitors to the Orlando area also 
visit either or both of the Gulf and Atlantic coastal areas.
• Commuters—previous reports documented a trend toward residents willing to travel 30 
to 60 minutes to their jobs, a trend that was expected to continue.
• Businesses—six industrial clusters were identified (aviation and aerospace; information 
technology; medical technologies; microelectronics modeling; simulation and training; 
optics and photonics), all needing to bring employees to and from their places of 
business.
• Freight movement—the Interstate 4 corridor is a gateway to the Port of Tampa and 
provides connections to urban areas throughout the state; moving passenger rail off the 
same tracks used by freight would benefit both.78
The Investment Grade Ridership Study provided ridership and ticket revenue forecasts for two 
potential alignments. The report began with a description of base conditions and expected 
demographic trends that would warrant HSR. The study predicted that total corridor 
population would increase 33 percent between 2002 and 2025. The Orlando region, 
including Orange, Seminole, and Osceola Counties, was expected to increase by 46 percent 
during this same period; the Tampa Bay region, including Hillsborough, Pasco, and 
Pinellas Counties, by 23 percent; and Polk County by 38 percent.79 Employment during 
that same 23-year period was expected to increase by 46 percent, and hotel rooms (a 
measure to estimate growth of visitor travel) was estimated to increase 83 percent, with the 
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highest increase in the Orlando region.80 The tremendous growth potential was not limited 
to population and hotel rooms. Forecasts for air passengers at Orlando International Airport 
(OIA) showed steady growth through 2010, and estimates out another 15 years suggested a 
93 percent increase, for a total of 52 million passengers per year by 2025.81 When matched 
against the existing transportation system in Florida, it was clear that the tremendous 
projected growth in population, employment, and tourism would quickly outpace the 
system’s highway and air capacity.
In August 2003, after two of the four proposals submitted were found to be preliminarily 
responsive to the 2002 Request for Proposals,82 a Draft Environmental Impact Statement 
(DEIS) was issued for the Tampa-to-Orlando HSR, noting that “the purpose of the proposed 
project is to enhance passenger mobility between Tampa and Orlando” and that such 
mobility “is viewed as essential for the sustained economic growth of the region, as well as 
the quality of life of the region’s residents and visitors.”83 It further argued that while 
current transportation demand between the two cities was primarily met through the 
highway system, that system “is already operating at or near capacity during an extended 
peak hour of each day, and although capacity improvements…are either currently underway 
or planned for the near future, they are considered interim, ‘first phase’ improvements.”84
The DEIS considered several alternatives in meeting the forecasted demand via HSR:
• A no-build option that would provide no alternative travel mode to buses and 
automobiles
• Two technology alternatives
• gas-turbine-powered, locomotive-hauled trains with passenger equipment similar to 
Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor Acela (Fluor Bombardier)
• an electric-powered, locomotive-hauled train similar to the French TGV (Global 
Rail Consortium)
• Four alignment alternatives (see Table 5)
Table 5 Tampa-Orlando DEIS Alignment Choices  
Alignment Tampa Tampa-
Orlando
Orlando
A I-275/I-4 I-4 Bee Line Expressway/Taft-Vineland Rd.
B I-275/I-4 I-4 S.R. 536/Central Florida Greeneway
42  High-Speed Rail Case Studies
Mineta Transportation Institute
At a minimum, the DEIS stipulated an HSR system that would operate 12 round trips 
daily, 7 days a week, from 6 A.M. to 8 P.M., at speeds of at least 120 mph. Each train would 
need to accommodate at least 250 passengers, with a travel time between Tampa and 
Orlando of 70 minutes. New tracks would be laid for the majority of the segment for any 
alignment. After taking into account the potential impacts and revenues for each of the 
technologies, running in each of the four possible alignments, the FHSRA named Fluor-
Bombardier as the first-ranked proposer and selected the Greeneway as the preferred 
alignment in Orlando, noting that the environmental impacts for both Orlando alignments 
were similar but the Greeneway alignment offered a potential for higher ridership revenues, 
lower cost, and the least financial risk.85 (In terms of the overall choices, Alignment B is the 
preferred alignment, but agreement is still needed from the Orlando-Orange County 
Expressway Authority.) The FHSRA executed a contract with Fluor-Bombardier to provide 
professional services in support of the completion of a Final EIS (FEIS), to be conducted at 
no cost to the FSHRA or the state.86 Work on the FEIS began in January 2004. At the same 
time, the FHSRA began negotiations with Fluor-Bombardier regarding potential changes 
to the latter’s proposal that would incorporate some of the attributes of the second-ranked 
proposal, in particular the addition of a second track to Disney World.87
The Fluor-Bombardier Proposal
Like the earlier FOX proposal, the Fluor-Bombardier proposal is based on a public-private 
partnership that will provide a “privately developed and operated public facility that will be 
owned by the [FHSR] Authority.”88 Team members include Fluor Corporation; 
Bombardier, Inc.; Skanska-Granite-Lane, Joint Venture; Hubbard Construction Company; 
Martin K. Eby Construction Company, Inc.; Marta Track Constructors, Inc.; HDR 
Engineering, Inc; and Lehman Brothers. The base proposal, before the changes being 
negotiated, offered a single track, located in the median of Interstate 4 between Tampa and 
C CSX Line/I-75 I-4 Bee Line Expressway/Taft-Vineland Rd.
D CSX Line/I-75 I-4 S.R. 536/Central Florida Greeneway
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration and FHSRA, “Draft Environmental Impact 
Statement: Florida High-Speed Rail–Tampa to Orlando” (August 2003), p. S-6.
Table 5 Tampa-Orlando DEIS Alignment Choices  (Continued)
Alignment Tampa Tampa-
Orlando
Orlando
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the Osceola/Orange County border, with a double track in the Greeneway median from the 
border to the Orlando International Airport.
The financial plan places initial ridership revenue risk on the private sector and guarantees 
operations and maintenance costs for the first seven years of service. Figure 8 shows the 
proposed cash flow for the first full year of operation.89 While the firm fixed price is 
$2.06 billion for construction, with the private sector responsible for any cost overruns, the 
FHSRA estimates a total cost of $2.38 billion once ROW, environmental mitigation, and 
other contingencies are factored in.90 State contributions of $75 million annually would pay 
for infrastructure, and Fluor has proposed the use of Tax Credit Bonds to leverage annual 
state appropriations to finance the track and systems. Rolling stock would be financed using 
a combination of federal grants and tax-exempt bonds, again repaid from ridership revenues. 
Operations and maintenance would be financed by ridership revenues and backed by a 
$50 million credit from the Fluor team, although the contract may be reopened for 
negotiation after seven years if ridership projections are not met.
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Figure 8 Proposed Cash Flow in First Full Year of Operation
Current Status
By the end of 2003, the Florida Legislature had authorized $14 million for the HSR project, 
but then Governor Bush vetoed $5 million of those funds and stated he would not support 
further new HSR efforts.91 As mentioned earlier, he and the State CFO, Thomas Gallagher 
(who is also currently Chair of Derail the Bullet Train), actively engaged in the campaign to 
repeal the amendment in November 2004. By June 1, 2004, they had 54,774 signatures 
deemed valid, but for the repeal to appear on the November 2004 ballot, they needed 
488,722 signatures.92 On June 2, 2004, Dockery filed a “Complaint for Injunctive Relief 
and Petition for Writ of Mandamus,” against Secretary of State Glenda Hood, demanding 
the invalidation of a number of the validated signatures, arguing that they were not 
obtained according to Florida State Law.93 By November, however, enough signatures were 
declared valid that the repeal was placed on the ballot and was overwhelmingly supported in 
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the November 2004 general elections, with 63.7 percent voting for the repeal.94
Nevertheless, as Dockery points out, this was not necessarily a vote to kill the concept of 
HSR in Florida, since prior legislation still exists and other avenues are still being 
followed.95 According to Gary Brosch, Executive Director, Coast2Coast Rail Consortium 
and Chair of the National Center for Transit Research at the University of South Florida, the 
FHSRA met recently and decided to continue moving ahead with plans for HSR between 
Tampa and Orlando despite the repeal of the amendment.96
Prior to the repeal, the FHSRA had been negotiating with the Orlando Orange County 
Expressway Authority (OOCEA) and Walt Disney World in order to use the preferred 
(Greeneway) route.97 In February 2004, the OOCEA agreed to begin an assessment of HSR 
using the ROW along the Greeneway if the FHSRA would pay for any costs incurred as a 
result of conducting the study. The OOCEA was clear that their agreement to assess the 
HSR option does not constitute their willingness to allow the use of their ROW nor will it 
necessarily result in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), which is needed for the Record 
of Decision to be issued by the Federal Railroad Administration.98 In the most recent 
pronouncement by the FHSRA that they would continue to move ahead on HSR, the 
Authority also decided to change the preferred alignment from Greeneway to the Bee Line, 
which would serve Universal Studios.99
Fluor Bombardier continued to advance its plans, announcing that Virgin Group (Virgin 
Rail and Airlines) had agreed to join the team. Virgin Group, which has extensive 
experience with HSR operations in the United Kingdom, would operate and market HSR 
in Florida if the project is realized.100 However, with the voter repeal of the HSR 
amendment in 2004, the situation has become more complex as the FHSRA has agreed to 
reconsider the proposal by Global Rail Consortium, initially ranked second behind Fluor 
Bombardier, because they are offering additional private sector investment.101
FDOT remains committed to its Vision Plan and intends to move ahead with Amtrak on 
Phase 1, the extension of Amtrak’s national service. The state has committed $64 million to 
the project, and FDOT has begun negotiating with Florida East Coast Railway (FEC) over 
issues arising from use of FEC ROW. Negotiations were put on hold, in part because of the 
parallel effort aimed at new HSR and in part because of a change in the national legal and 
political climate when David Gunn assumed leadership of Amtrak. The focus of the 
national passenger rail system shifted from expansion to achieving a state-of-good-repair on 
lines owned by Amtrak. Furthermore, Amtrak was directed by the U.S. DOT to cease and 
desist on any expansion and planning for expansion as a condition of a $100 million 
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Railroad Rehabilitation and Infrastructure Funding (RRIF) loan to Amtrak in June 2002. 
This restriction, which was included in Amtrak’s appropriations for FY2003 and FY2004, 
combined with the reluctance by the State of Florida to fund infrastructure improvements, 
has left the FEC initiative in limbo.102 However, according to Haddad, there have been 
signals that this may soon be resolved so they can implement Phase 1 of the Vision Plan.103
Assessment of the Case
For 30 years, the state of Florida has pursued HSR in one form or another. Each time 
progress is made, setbacks occur and the process begins again. The situation now appears to 
be more of a stalemate with three discernible positions: those advocating new HSR, those 
opposed to all HSR plans, and those who want an incremental approach. How to best end 
this stalemate, and whether the current Fluor Bombardier HSR project will be built, is 
unclear. However, Florida’s experience offers some powerful lessons and themes for 
consideration for HSR elsewhere in the country.
Cost and Financing
The issue of cost and financing in the Florida case has several dimensions. In the immediate 
debate over cost, the central concern is the business model and who should bear the risk for 
a project that is described as having a public benefit but looking for private dollars. The 
private sector wants the state to bear more of the risk; the state wants the private sector and 
the federal government to assume more risk.
Further complicating the question of who will pay is Florida’s long-standing bias against 
taxes. Florida ranks 33rd among states in terms of per capita state and local tax burden and 
collects no income tax. The proportion of personal income spent on taxes in Florida is the 
sixth lowest in the country.104 If HSR is to be built, public funds are needed, but how to 
raise such funds in an antitax environment, particularly when many people are skeptical of 
the public benefit, is a critical dilemma.
Another dimension of the cost and financing issue relates to how costs and benefits are 
measured. There is a tendency in the United States to look at financing HSR as bottom-line 
driven, identifying capital and operational costs on one side and revenues on the other. As 
long as this is the case, the United States is unlikely to see HSR in any form.105 A broader 
view of costs and benefits—one that considers costs borne by the public as a result of 
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capacity increases in other forms of transport should a no-build option be taken—often 
results in a very different mixture of economic results.106
Finally, there is a fundamental issue related to the role of the federal government and what 
several people have deemed the myth that railroads can pay for themselves, even when this 
is rarely the case. The various proposals put forth in Florida have been expected to show how 
HSR can pay for itself, although there is no credible evidence that total self-sufficiency can 
be achieved. Such plans have been met with skepticism by those opposed to HSR, as well as 
by some who want to see HSR implemented in Florida but believe that public support is 
needed. All the proposals have included some federal monies in their cost estimates and 
projections; however, federal funding is unlikely to be available, given the historical 
reluctance to invest in rail. Federal reluctance to help subsidize rail, even as it aids air, 
highways, and other modes, trickles down to state and local governments. Thus, without 
more federal support for such projects, they are unlikely to succeed in the near future.
The Approach and the Need for Clear Goals Around Which a Consensus Can Be Built
Another theme for consideration and potential lesson learned in Florida relates to the 
implementation approach being pursued, namely new HSR versus incremental HSR. In the 
United States, both new and incremental HSR projects have been presented. No new HSR 
systems have been implemented, but examples of incremental HSR exist (Northeast 
Corridor Acela and the Empire Corridor Turbotrain), and several others are underway (in the 
Pacific Northwest and the Chicago Hub). All the incremental HSR projects are, or are 
planned to be, supported by public funds.
The needs and goals identified determine the best approach for a particular area. In Florida, 
beyond the discussions of costs and time is an undercurrent of dissension over the exact need 
and goals for HSR. Advocates of new HSR speak of the need to eliminate or mitigate 
congestion, but opponents strongly believe that in a state with little passenger rail or 
transit, there are other ways to alleviate congestion that might be both more effective and 
less costly. As Heidi Eddins, Executive Vice President and General Counsel of FEC, notes, if 
the ultimate goal is to have an integrated and comprehensive transportation system for 
Florida, it “makes no sense to start at the end, and that is what [the new HSR project] is 
doing.”107 She argues that to relieve congestion and move people from cars to public transit, 
including rail and bus, the key is to offer more commuter options focused on reliability, 
frequency of service, and accessibility. The proposed new HSR system along a relatively 
short segment, with few stops, would not offer this.
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Even among those who support new HSR in Florida, there is concern over the current 
choice of corridor. As Ron Hartman, Executive Vice President of Yellow Transportation, 
points out, the real time savings and revenue-generating possibilities are found on the 
longer trip to Miami, and “the Tampa–Orlando corridor, without the Miami link, is hard to 
justify.”108 Eugene Skoropowski notes that building new HSR between Tampa and Orlando 
is “like building a tree without the trunk. Will a train be nice in that corridor? Yes. Will it 
be able to demonstrate the real capacity of HSR? Not until it is expanded to include 
Miami.”109
The current project, like those before it, appears to be caught in an impasse because it has 
been whittled down to a portion of the route that even some proponents find hard to 
support in the current political and economic climate. This relates to the ongoing debate 
over whom the current HSR will serve in Florida. Many believe that the key constituencies 
being served by the initial corridor are tourists and the related private sector industries, 
leading them back to the question of why public funds should be used. Private support 
among those who would most benefit by the Tampa–Orlando HSR is not as strong as one 
might imagine. During the earlier FOX project, Orlando International Airport was an 
active supporter of HSR (and continues to be) but many of the tourist attractions, notably 
Walt Disney World, were decidedly neutral in their reactions, waiting to see what 
alignments might be used. During the current discussions, Disney is more supportive of the 
project and negotiating with the FHSRA now that the alignment would include a stop at 
Disney World. However, Orlando Universal Studios was actively engaged in the Derail the 
Bullet Train efforts, contributing more than $220,000 to the campaign.110
The Political Arena
In several other cases, most notably the Texas TGV experience, specific interest groups were 
much involved in preventing HSR plans from being implemented. In Florida, specific 
interest groups have also played a role at times. In the case of FOX, for example, 
environmental groups and land developers both voiced strong opposition to the Miami-
Orlando routing, citing concerns over the Everglades (although in the latter case, this may 
have had to do more with the possibility of losing potential areas for development if the 
HSR line was put in place). The small airport authorities, which had been developing plans 
for expansion to serve as feeders to the larger airports, opposed HSR as a competitor. The 
role of the major airlines is more ambiguous. Furthermore, in the latest round of discussions 
regarding HSR, special interest groups do not seem to be playing as pivotal a role in the 
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overall discussions and debates as are key members of the legislature and executive branch, 
and the agencies and authorities involved.
The politics surrounding HSR in Florida are bipartisan, with opponents and proponents 
found on both sides of the political fence, and a somewhat disjointed process with multiple 
ideas being put forth and none being realized. Both Democratic and Republican governors, 
for example, have been critical to getting HSR projects underway and to stopping those 
projects under later administrations. Efforts to support the 2000 Constitutional 
amendment, as well as those aimed at repealing it, have been sponsored by both Republican 
and Democratic legislators.
Several individuals in key leadership positions have changed their stance on HSR, in 
particular Governor Bush and Thomas Gallagher. Before becoming Florida’s CFO and 
current chair of the Derail the Bullet Train, Gallagher had voted to support HSR. Bush, 
while perhaps never a full advocate, was much less opposed to HSR before taking office, and 
some felt he was supportive of FOX. Why their stances shifted is unclear (their offices did 
not respond to requests for interviews); however, in the more recent discussions between 
FHSRA and Fluor Bombardier, Florida’s bid for the 2012 Olympics may have played a role. 
Tampa was being supported as a potential site for the Olympics, but it would have needed 
the hotel capacity found in Orlando and quick and efficient transportation to get there. 
Thus, HSR found support in quarters it might not have otherwise. One cannot know for 
certain whether HSR would have been implemented if Tampa had been selected for the 
Olympics, but it offers a glimpse of the possibility that a key rallying point could have 
made a difference.
Individual personalities have played an important role, both positively and negatively, in 
shaping and modifying Florida’s HSR experience for three decades. Governor Graham first 
launched Florida on its HSR path, with his unwavering belief that Florida needed a system 
similar to the Japanese Shinkansen. Many people were involved in the studies, proposals, and 
plans, but it was Governor Chiles who terminated them. Eight years later, Governor Bush 
was a critical stopping point for HSR, and some have wondered whether personality clashes 
with FOX leaders may have played a role here. Key personalities need not be in top 
leadership positions. C.C. Dockery has been involved in advocating HSR for several decades. 
He authored the recently repealed amendment and helped define the spirit in which it has 
been interpreted, that is, new HSR.
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While the nuances are not all evident, it is apparent from the Florida case that, given the 
time to develop and implement HSR, continuous leadership and support is critical. More 
important, this leadership and support needs to be institutional in nature. Studies and plans 
often span several administrations, and Florida shows how easily efforts can be curtailed by a 
single person.
More important, but related, thus far the Constitutional amendment itself could not 
guarantee sufficient support to implement HSR. In a political climate heavily affected by 
personalities and lacking an institutional support structure with sufficient autonomy 
regarding funds, responsibility, and authority, the amendment has become one more item 
that is placed at the forefront of the debate by some and ignored by others. When asked 
what will happen now that the November 2004 elections are over and how best to overcome 
the HSR impasse, the answer often given is that proponents of HSR will probably have to 
wait until a more pro-HSR governor replaces Bush. At the least, everyone will need to wait 
until the legislature decides in 2005 whether to provide additional funding for plans in 
progress.
CALIFORNIA
Despite several well-publicized problems, California is one of the few U.S. states that is 
promoting high-speed passenger rail and moving ahead to make it happen. Figure 9 shows 
a rough approximation of the proposed California Corridor.
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Figure 9 California Corridor
California has three Amtrak corridors: the Los Angeles–San Diego Corridor, the Capital 
Corridor between Oakland and Sacramento, and the San Joaquin Service connecting 
Bakersfield, Stockton, Oakland, and Sacramento. Funding for each line is predominantly 
provided by the state, with federal and local governments, Amtrak, and the railroads 
making up most of the remainder.111
In terms of commuter rail, two major developments affect the development of incremental 
high-speed rail in California:
• Public agencies have assumed control from the railroads over some tracks.
• Successful commuter systems have resulted in a fundamental change in public attitudes 
about passenger rail.
In 2004, the Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board (Caltrain) inaugurated faster commuter 
trains called “Baby Bullets” that reduce the 1-hour-36-minute travel time from San 
Francisco to San Jose to less than 1 hour, comparing favorably with automobile travel. This 
is the only California commuter rail service that has emphasized high speed. The trains 
travel no faster than 79 mph, but the new grade separations, bypass tracks at stations, 
improved track throughout the system, and limited stops allow more efficient operation. 
Baby Bullets were supported by State Senator Jackie Speier, a Democrat from Hillsborough. 
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Her Peninsula constituents benefit from improved connections to San Francisco and San 
Jose. She obtained $127 million in traffic congestion relief funds from the state to build 
bypass track and to buy six new locomotives and seventeen cars. Other local and grant 
money went toward improvement in the line’s signal system, track upgrades, and an 
overhaul of two stations.112
In terms of high-speed rail specifically, California has pursued two fronts:
• Incremental improvement of existing rail lines to provide faster, more frequent 
passenger rail service
• Advanced plans for a completely new rail system on dedicated, high-speed rails, to 
provide genuinely high-speed service competitive with air passenger service
The two fronts are largely separate, with little overlap in the organizational structure. 
Current incremental plans and projects do not depend on high-speed rail plans and projects. 
However, the history of intercity and commuter rail in California demonstrates support and 
some willingness to fund rail service as an alternative to the automobile. The support comes 
both from government agencies at state, regional, and local levels and from the public, as 
demonstrated by successful ballot measures to provide funding.
The California High-Speed Rail Authority
The positive reaction of automobile-dependent Californians to two 1990 rail transit bond 
issues (Propositions 108 and 116) encouraged transportation thinkers and legislators to 
consider a more ambitious plan—to connect the San Francisco Bay Area with the Los 
Angeles area by a dedicated high-speed rail system. The distance is less than 500 miles, 
within the theoretical range where high-speed ground transportation could compete with 
air.
HSR innovators in the legislature included state senators Quentin Kopp, Jim Costa, 
Richard Katz, Jim Mills, and Rebecca Morgan; Bay Area political leaders included Rod 
Diridon, Chair of the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors; Representative Lynn Schenk 
from San Diego was also involved. Given term limits and the passage of time, all have left 
office. Nongovernmental organizations included the Planning and Conservation League. 
Several private tours were organized for the legislators and local officials to visit and ride 
HSR lines in Japan (Shinkansen), Germany (InterCity Express–ICE), and France (Train à 
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Grande Vitesse–TGV). All three systems feature state-of-the-art electric trains on exclusive, 
dedicated rights-of-way, operating at speeds between 150 and 190 mph.
The first formal step was the legislature’s move in 1994 to create the High-Speed Rail 
Commission, which was directed to conduct a feasibility study of HSR in California and 
report back to the legislature. The feasibility study was completed in 1996, and the 
commission reported that a high-speed rail system in California was feasible. As a result, the 
California legislature enacted Senate Bill 1420, effective September 24, 1996, as California 
Public Utilities Code Sections 185000, et seq. The leadership of Independent State Senator 
Quentin Kopp of San Francisco was essential. Governor Pete Wilson was unenthusiastic but 
deferred to Senator Kopp. The High-Speed Rail Commission eventually became an 
Authority, allowing substantial autonomy and power under California law.
The legislature required the California High-Speed Rail Authority (CHSRA) to prepare a 
business plan, which was completed in June 2000. As a result of legislative approval of the 
CHSRA Final Business Plan, the Authority mandate was extended. To date, the CHSRA 
has resisted attempts to bring it under the control of the California Department of 
Transportation (Caltrans), so it operates independently.
The CHSRA proposes to build a
…high-speed train system for intercity travel in California between the 
major metropolitan centers of Sacramento and the San Francisco Bay Area in 
the north, through the Central Valley, to Los Angeles and San Diego in the 
south...projected to carry as many as 68 million passengers annually by the 
year 2020...speeds in excess of 200 miles per hour...on a fully grade-separated 
track, with state-of-the-art safety, signaling, and automated control 
systems.113
Electric propulsion is recommended.
The updated 2000 Business Plan estimated $25 billion. The first phase, the so-called Starter 
Line from Los Angeles to San Francisco, is planned to cost $14 to 15 billion. Additional 
lines later will extend to Sacramento from Los Angeles, to Sacramento from San Francisco, 
and from Los Angeles to San Diego.
The legislature authorized $20 million for a comprehensive environmental study. The 
CHSRA and the FRA completed the draft Environmental Impact Report/Environmental 
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Impact Statement (EIR/EIS) on January 20, 2004. Public hearings were held in Sacramento, 
Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, San Jose, and Fresno. Comments from the public 
were published by CHSRA on October 7, 2004.114
A preliminary study conducted before 1999 by technical engineers had recommended 
against the Altamont Pass Corridor for operational reasons; therefore, the draft document 
did not fully analyze that corridor. Testimony received during the hearings suggested 
interest in the Altamont Corridor and the possibility of another corridor in the Pacheco Pass 
area. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) encouraged the CHSRA Board to conduct 
more detailed studies of the access between the Central Valley and the Bay Area. Assuming 
that additional funding is provided in the 2005-2006 state budget, the additional study 
should be complete for hearings, and the full document, now called a Program Level 
Environmental Clearance, could be certified by the CHSRA Board in the spring of 2006.
Among other issues, the EIR/EIS examines the No-Project Alternative: What happens if we 
do nothing? The number of passengers traveling intercity in California is forecasted to 
increase up to 63 percent over the next 20 years; the state’s population is projected to 
increase by 31 percent by 2020.115 New population estimates are forthcoming.
The No-Project Alternative would result in an intercity transportation 
network that would not be as safe as, would have increased travel times, and 
would be significantly less reliable than existing conditions....would also 
exacerbate...energy use and dependence on petroleum...would result in 
environmental impacts...gridlock on the highways and airports.116
Another alternative is the Modal Alternative, that is, further expansion of highways and 
airports but no HSR. The Modal Alternative would produce greater environmental impact 
and would not be as safe or reliable as the high-speed alternative.117 Any modal alternative 
would require the taking of far more land for highways and airports than any HSR 
alternative. In the original Business Plan, the CHSRA estimated that the complete HSR 
project would cost $37 billion. It would cost $82 billion to expand the highway network 
and the airports to accommodate as many passengers as HSR would carry.
The original schedule for certification had assumed placing bonds for the Starter Line on the 
state ballot in November 2004. Delay in certification became less significant when 
California’s deepening fiscal crisis caused Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and the 
legislature to place a $15 billion bailout bond on that ballot. Voters also had authorized 
 High-Speed Rail Case Studies 55
Mineta Transportation Institute
$4 billion in education bonds in March 2004, and the public willingness to support the 
HSR bonds might have been tested. With the consent of the CHSRA Board, the legislature 
and the governor agreed to delay the HSR bonds to what they presume will be a more 
favorable November 2006 ballot.
Some political forces wanted to delay the HSR bond vote until 2008. However, such a 
lengthy delay would invalidate the EIR/EIS already completed, and the expensive procedure 
would have to begin anew. The CHSRA stated that a delay to 2008 probably would kill the 
entire HSR idea. That the legislature followed this reasoning could indicate fundamental 
support among current California legislators for the project. There will undoubtedly be 
competing causes for voter support whatever year is chosen.
Federal action is uncertain. California expects about $18 billion in support from the TEA-
21 renewal legislation, which at present is speculative. California Congressional members 
have stated that they would try to couple federal HSR funding with a designation as a “new 
industry,” or perhaps as a “demonstration” project. The latter cannot be downgraded or 
ignored by the bureaucracy.
Construction was scheduled to begin in 2008-2009, but will have to await voter action in 
2006. SYSTRA—a joint venture of Bechtel, Parsons-Brinckerhoff, and others—is waiting 
in the wings. There seems to be a genuine hope, based on an economic analysis prepared for 
the CHSRA, that the Starter Line will generate funds to build further lines.118
So far, organized opposition to California HSR has been light. Southwest Airlines, a 
vehement opponent of high-speed rail in Texas, has been quiet in California. The only major 
political opponent has been State Senator Tom McClintock, the unsuccessful Republican 
opponent to Governor Schwarzenegger in the 2003 recall and election. McClintock favors 
only highway projects.
Those who support HSR but want it to serve parochial interests create more serious 
difficulty. The Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), L.A. 
County Supervisor Mike Antonovich, L.A. City Councilman and mayoral candidate 
Antonio Villaraigosa, and other politicians want the HSR route to go far to the east via 
Palmdale and Tehachapi. This was the route of the Southern Pacific’s San Joaquin Daylight, 
which took 4-1/2 long hours to travel from Los Angeles to Bakersfield. A recent public 
hearing in Los Angeles produced no enthusiastic supporters of high-speed rail; only public 
officials from Palmdale were present. Palmdale activists want a high-speed connection 
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between Los Angeles International Airport and the Palmdale Intercontinental Airport, 
which the Los Angeles Department of Airports wants to promote. High-speed rail to the 
Bay Area is not their focus.
The CHSRA prefers a direct route over the mountains from Los Angeles to Bakersfield. This 
is the highway route known as the Grapevine or the Ridge Route. Caltrans built I-5 over 
this difficult terrain because it is the most logical route. CHSRA believes likewise, since the 
purpose is to transport people rapidly between the Los Angeles Area and the Bay Area, not 
to service intermediate, out-of-the-way towns. So far there has been little opposition to the 
Grapevine route as a result of its planned tunnel crossing of the infamous San Andreas Fault. 
The EIR/EIS discusses this issue, but scientific study could be trumped by sensationalism if 
a major earthquake hits. Geologists and the authorities are aware of the Palmdale Bulge, a 
detectable rise in the earth, which signifies potential movement along the San Andreas 
Fault between Los Angeles and Bakersfield. CHSRA can point out that the 1989 Loma 
Prieta earthquake in the Bay Area destroyed highway structures, including part of the 
critical Bay Bridge, but did not harm any rail tunnels, such as BART’s Trans-Bay tube.
Train Riders of California (TRAC), a small, nonprofit group, has voiced opposition to the 
proposed route linking the Bay Area over the coastal mountains to the San Joaquin Valley. 
While TRAC fundamentally supports incremental improvements to existing rail lines, it 
considers HSR to be a diversion of resources.119 Several public agencies also are concerned 
about diversion of resources. The Southern California Regional Rail Authority (SCRRA) 
“...is concerned that...the [high-speed train] HST system will divert already limited state 
and federal funding from Metrolink projects. The HST system should not be funded in lieu 
of funding for expansion of the Metrolink system.”120 The Southern California Association 
of Governments (SCAG), which favors Maglev technology, states: “SCAG is concerned 
about the use of such existing local funds and state transportation revenue sources.”121 The 
MTA in Los Angeles, one of five SCRRA members, states: “The proposed project should not 
divert critical state and federal funding for MTA’s surface transportation programs.”122 The 
San Joaquin Council of Governments in Stockton worried: “The cost of the HSR may delay 
other critically needed transportation improvements.”123 Political leadership will be 
necessary to overcome such interagency concerns.
Environmentalists and the California Department of Parks and Recreation oppose the 
proposed route through the Henry Coe State Park and the Orestimba Wilderness east of 
Gilroy, and do not like the alternate proposal through neighboring Pacheco Pass.124 The 
CHRSA maintains that environmentally friendly construction can be done through the 
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Pacheco Pass, where a four-lane highway already exists, or even through Henry Coe State 
Park under Mt. Hamilton. Either of those routes is necessary in order to route the HSR from 
San Francisco through San Jose, over (or under) the hills, into the San Joaquin Valley. Some 
environmentalists prefer a route over the Altamont Pass, but this route is to the north of San 
Jose, which then would be served by a secondary line instead of the HSR main line. San Jose 
is the third-largest city in California, the tenth-largest in the nation, and the center of 
Silicon Valley, an important producer of economic activity and jobs. In making the original 
choice of the Pacheco Pass option, the CHSRA determined that a more direct line to San 
Jose saves time and has higher potential to attract passengers. “The CHSRA and the Bay 
Area Metropolitan Transportation Commission recommended dropping the Altamont Pass 
alternative route in 1999, and reaffirmed that decision in 2003.”125 The Altamont Pass 
alternative also would require a new bridge across the lower San Francisco Bay, in the 
middle of a marine sanctuary, guaranteeing intervention from environmental interests. The 
continuing environmental work is focusing more analysis on the Altamont Pass alternative 
and another more southerly option.
It appears that most political forces support HSR in principle. Legislative leaders such as 
state senators Burton and Murray are active supporters, although under California’s strict 
term limits, Burton left office in 2004. The Senate Transportation Committee has taken 
leadership for HSR. The press has been favorable, although not passionate. The Sierra Club 
had been a supporter, until some members became embroiled in the debate over Altamont 
Pass versus Pacheco Pass.126
The Business Plan estimated that “nearly two-thirds of Californians already endorse 
building a high-speed system and would be willing to pay for its construction.” That may 
be, although this estimate is a result of a poll which asked simply if the respondent 
approved or disapproved. The estimate might be different if HSR were to be ranked with 
other projects such as public school construction, medical care for seniors, tax reduction, and 
police and fire protection.
CHSRA Executive Director Mehdi Morshed is optimistic about the chances of success. He 
believes that there is political momentum and that California voters will respond to the 
innovative, high-tech nature of the project. The voters will find it on the 2006 ballot, unless 
the legislature ultimately moves it to the 2008 ballot.
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Observations
A few preliminary observations may be drawn from the California experience:
• Leadership is critical. There was leadership in the California Legislature at several stages 
in rail development, including the successful 1990 bond issues and in the moves to 
create the CHSRA. It remains to be seen whether strong pro-HSR leadership will be in 
place in 2006 when the HSR bonds will be on the ballot. HSR success at that point 
might depend on the strong support of Governor Schwarzenegger and on his impact on 
voters at the time. As with any California election, the ability of supporters to raise the 
funding for a strong statewide campaign will be a factor.
• Seeing is believing. When politicians or other leaders visit and ride existing HSR 
systems (Shinkansen, ICE, TGV), they return enthusiastic. Major political leaders in 
California have made such visits, but not at state expense. The same might be true of the 
traveling public. The international nature of many California businesses means that 
many voters have been exposed to existing HSR, presumably with favorable results.
• The incremental approach may lead to success in implementing new HSR if both are 
pursued concurrently. California has had several successes in incremental rail projects, 
persuading at least a portion of the public that rail is a good alternative to the auto 
culture. More likely, political leadership is a far more important factor.
• Timing is important. The 1990 California bond issues were voted on in an upbeat 
economy. The HSR bonds have been delayed until the economy is more robust, which 
legislators believe will improve chances for approval.
• While successive campaigns have played a role in educating Californians about the 
respective costs and benefits of various transportation modes, most citizens are 
unprepared to assess the value of a project as major as the California Corridor. This lack 
of understanding is not unique to California, which suggests that a federal role in public 
education about all modes and their costs and benefits would be beneficial.
It is uncertain to what extent a federal political role in California may be appropriate. 
Undoubtedly a federal voice would be appropriate commensurate with federal money.
PACIFIC NORTHWEST
When Amtrak assumed passenger rail services from the railroads in May 1971, it continued 
limited passenger service—one train—on the Burlington Northern Railway (BN, formerly 
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Great Northern Railway) track between Portland, Oregon, and Seattle, Washington. One 
additional Amtrak train per day, the Coast Starlight between Seattle and Los Angeles, ran 
on the BN between Seattle and Portland, and on the Southern Pacific between Portland and 
Eugene, Oregon. There was no rail service between Seattle and Vancouver, B.C., after 1981.
People in the Pacific Northwest often pride themselves on environmental sensitivity and 
look for ways to reduce reliance on the environmentally unfriendly automobile. This has led 
to attacks on the automobile culture in the public at large and required a change of 
philosophy about railroads. Railroads have remained private companies with a negative 
image because of the nineteenth-century robber barons.127 Public reluctance to use public 
funds to support railroads lingers. In the 1980s, however, sentiment began to grow in 
Washington State to develop the obsolete rail passenger service into a modern, high-speed, 
high-intensity rail corridor. (Unless otherwise noted, in this section “Washington” refers to 
the State of Washington.) The Washington Legislature began funding improvements to 
railroad stations, apparently a first step toward the treatment of a rail passenger system as a 
state concern, not simply an obligation of Amtrak and the private railroad companies.
Similar efforts were underway in Oregon. Oregon experimented with state-supported, 
Amtrak-run Willamette Valley passenger trains between Portland and Eugene in 1980 and 
1981. The Willamette Valley is the heart of Oregon, and there are important population 
centers between Portland and Eugene in this 124-mile minicorridor.128 However, the state 
withdrew funding and the trains were discontinued, officially because of lack of funds.129 In 
fact, ridership had been poor because of poor schedule adherence and substandard track 
conditions on the Southern Pacific line. It was easier and faster to drive. The Oregon 
Legislature established a State Rail Rehabilitation Fund in 1985, but never appropriated 
money for it.
The Era of Federally Mandated Studies
In 1991 Congress passed ISTEA, which, among other things, required the U.S. DOT to 
identify potential major high-speed transportation corridors. In 1992, the U.S. DOT 
identified the Pacific Northwest Rail Corridor (PNWRC) as one of five potential high-
speed corridors. This designated corridor extends from Washington State south to Eugene, 
Oregon, and north to Vancouver, B.C. The PNWRC extends a total of 466 miles: 134 miles 
in Oregon, 297 miles in Washington, and 35 miles in British Columbia (Figure 10). It 
appears that political pressure from Washington was significant in this Congressional 
action, particularly from Washington Congressman Al Swift. Designation as a corridor 
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means the possibility of matching federal grants for construction and operation through the 
FRA. It also requires the states in the corridor to complete studies and plans to develop the 
corridor at federal expense.
Figure 10 Pacific Northwest Corridor
Washington
Washington efforts preceded ISTEA. In the late 1980s, the legislature requested the 
Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) to conduct a “High-Speed 
Ground Transportation Study.” Upon enactment of ISTEA, the Washington State 
Legislature took the next formal step with a directive to WSDOT to develop a 
“comprehensive assessment of the feasibility of developing a high-speed ground 
transportation system in the State of Washington”130 (emphasis added). WSDOT responded in 
October 1992 with a High-Speed Ground Transportation Study, which confirmed the feasibility 
of high-speed rail in Washington. Based on that study, the Washington legislature in April 
1993 directed WSDOT to develop “high-quality intercity passenger rail service...through 
incremental upgrading of the existing service”131 (emphasis added). WSDOT had used the 
term “high-speed”; the Washington legislature did not. The legislature specifically wanted 
to build a “rail culture” to “make rail a competitive and viable alternative to automobile and 
commuter air travel.”132 Washington defines “high speed” as “up to 125 mph on sections of 
the corridor,” after 20 years of development.133 After 20 years, WSDOT plans for the trains 
to make the 466-mile trip between Vancouver, B.C., and Eugene, Oregon, in 7 hours, 
12 minutes. Seattle to Portland, 186 miles, should take 2-1/2 hours instead of the current 
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3 hours, 25 minutes.134 WSDOT estimated that the PNWRC upgrades from Seattle to 
Portland will cost $2.7 million per mile, compared with $6.5 million per mile per lane for a 
freeway in the corridor area.135
In 1998, the Washington Legislature and Governor Gary Locke created a Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Transportation to assess and oversee the entire Washington transportation 
system. The commission also assumed responsibility to plan for financial resources to fund 
the state’s portion of the 20-year transportation plan.
WSDOT published the Amtrak Plan for Washington State in April 2000. WSDOT always 
assumes a cooperative working relationship with the railroad (by that time Burlington 
Northern Santa Fe—BNSF). There do not appear to be any WSDOT suggestions to 
purchase railroad company rights-of-way, as public Authorities did in the Los Angeles area 
and on the San Francisco Peninsula.
Oregon
Inspired by the study incentives contained in ISTEA, Oregon prepared its first 
comprehensive assessment, the Oregon Rail Passenger Policy and Plan, in 1992, followed by 
the Oregon Rail Freight Plan in 1994. Oregon DOT published the Pacific Northwest Rail 
Corridor, Oregon Segment in April 2000, which is supposed to coordinate PNWRC efforts 
with Washington’s efforts. Oregon DOT followed up on November 8, 2001, with the 2001 
Oregon Rail Plan (2001 ORP), which followed the policies set in the 1992 Rail Passenger 
Policy.136 The 2001 ORP is an element of the Oregon Transportation Plan. Once again, the 
incentive for the plan was federal: “The Oregon Rail Plan is prepared to fulfill numerous 
federal and state planning requirements....The Plan also fulfills the Transportation Equity 
Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) requirement that state transportation planning consider, 
among other issues...options available to people...of the transportation system.”137
The practical goals of these plans are modest. Oregon originally proposed a $31 million 
capital program to improve the track, particularly the Portland-to-Eugene segment that 
Union Pacific (UP) had taken over from Southern Pacific. UP agreed to participate in 
funding track and signal system improvements.138
Unlike Washington, Oregon’s plans do not specify high-speed. Oregon DOT would be 
happy if two or three additional trains could traverse the 124 miles from Portland to Eugene 
in 2 hours, 15 minutes, an improvement of only 20 minutes over current scheduled 
62  High-Speed Rail Case Studies
Mineta Transportation Institute
performance. In a brief three paragraphs, the 2001 ORP dismisses high-speed rail; that is, 
train speeds in excess of 150 mph.139 Oregon is pursuing an incremental approach, as “an 
effective plan...that can be implemented in the next six years.” Oregon calculates that real 
high-speed rail would cost 12 to 15 times as much as the incremental plan, but would only 
attract five times as many riders. This thinking reflects highway planner logic, as if the 
comparisons were between two different highway alternatives. The three-paragraph 
dismissal of high-speed rail in 2001 ORP makes no effort to place any value on the 
consequences that might result if significantly more riders choose to use rail instead of the 
highway. Oregon does not compare the cost of rail per mile with the cost of a highway per 
mile, as WSDOT does.140
It is telling that Oregon DOT also refers to the I-5 corridor, an expression highway planners 
would use, not rail planners.141 Even if Oregon chose an incremental high-speed alternative, 
it would only allow passenger trains to operate at 110 to 125 mph.142
British Columbia
During this period, there was limited parallel interest in British Columbia. British 
Columbia contributed minimal cooperative funding for Options in 1995 and for the 
December 1997 Pacific Northwest Rail Corridor Operating Plan, but nothing further. There is 
no Canadian legislation comparable to ISTEA or TEA-21, no rail “corridor” designation 
from Ottawa, no mandated studies. The province of British Columbia did not prepare 
extensive studies comparable to those prepared in Washington and Oregon, and there are no 
plans there to improve the 35 miles of the PNWRC within British Columbia. The impetus 
to extend the PNWRC to Vancouver comes from the U.S. side, federal and state.
The Incremental Approach
The Washington legislature specified an incremental approach to what was loosely termed 
high-speed rail. Many reasons were given for an incremental approach instead of a new, 
dedicated high-speed rail system:
• Better chance to obtain funding over a period of years. Washington has adopted a 20-
year plan, with financing to be obtained in phases as construction occurs. Funding 
would be less probable for a new, and more expensive, dedicated high-speed rail project.
• Logical progression. Using existing rail routes reduces environmental impact problems; 
no “greenfield” project can escape massive environmental and NIMBY challenges. This 
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reason also presumes that freight railroads will welcome high-speed corridor 
development because improved rights-of-way imply more efficient freight movements.
• Market demand-driven development. Further construction phases will depend on the 
level of success or failure of service improvements already made. The public can see 
various phases of improvement as improvements are made.
• Rail culture development. This is a corollary to the previous item. As service improves 
and more people use the system, the population will become more favorably inclined 
toward rail systems, will use rail more and rely on automobiles less, and will support rail 
funding measures.
• Freight improvement. As rail infrastructure becomes more developed and sophisticated, 
freight will move more efficiently, providing a major impetus to the economy. Freight 
rail rationalization plans are afoot in Washington, comparable to the recently completed 
Alameda Corridor project in the Los Angeles area.143
• Less costly. The incremental approach may only attract 50 percent as many riders as a 
new, dedicated high-speed rail system, but the cost of incremental rail is only about 
12 percent as much as a new, dedicated, “greenfield” high-speed rail system.144
The population of the Pacific Northwest is smaller than that of California; therefore, the 
area is less able to justify an expensive, new, dedicated high-speed rail system.145
What Has Happened
Talgos
Probably the most important development was the WSDOT decision to experiment with 
Talgo technology. This Spanish technology features a pendular process that allows rail cars 
to tilt on curves. Tilting makes the ride on curved track more comfortable to passengers and 
allows faster operation on curves. Talgo trains also are lightweight, have a low center of 
gravity, and are articulated, all for a smoother ride on curved track. The trains are largely 
manufactured by the Talgo company in Spain, with some final assembly performed in 
Washington to comply with local-manufacture requirements. The locomotives are adapted 
General Motors F59s, manufactured in Canada. Talgos have been used successfully in 
Europe for many years.146 Washington leased two Spanish Talgo trains in 1995 for use on 
the PNWRC, and Amtrak operated them under the marketing name “Cascades.” Oregon 
began to support the service in 1995 and paid Amtrak to extend one Cascade per day from 
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Portland to Eugene. Washington paid to extend one Cascade per day to Vancouver, B.C. 
Introduction of the Talgos reduced the operating time from Seattle to Portland by 
30 minutes, largely due to higher speed capability on curves.
WSDOT initiated the experiment with Talgo technology in 1993, before WSDOT 
published the various studies in response to ISTEA.147 The trains were popular with 
passengers, so Washington returned the leased Talgos and bought two new, customized 
Talgo trainsets. Amtrak also bought two such trainsets. Talgo built a fifth trainset on spec 
and leased it to Oregon in 1999. The trains are modern and comfortable, and Talgo 
technology allows faster speeds on curved BNSF track along Puget Sound. Seattle-to-
Portland ridership in 1993 was 94,000 per year; it grew to 590,000 per year by 2003.148
The increase of ridership on the PNWRC is largely due to the popular introduction of the 
Talgos, which have been described as follows:
...based on growth trends, this service is the most successful passenger 
operation in North America in the past decade....Credit for the political 
commitment, say passenger advocates, mostly goes to Washington state, 
which significantly supported the service with cash, guidance, and 
staff....Amtrak has put its best into the effort, it’s widely agreed, as has track 
owner Burlington Northern Santa Fe, which has operated the Cascades service 
as if it were its own.149
Talgos are European design and have some minor discrepancies with FRA train regulations. 
The FRA waived the discrepancies but limited operation to a maximum of 79 mph. At 
present, this limitation is not important; PNWRC track conditions will not support speeds 
in excess of 79 mph. BNSF engineers, worried about increased rail wear on curves, studied 
the issue and determined that the Talgos did not materially increase wear on rails. The 
Talgos are lightweight, have a low center of gravity, and have tracking wheels, factors that 
save wear and tear on track.
The Talgo company decided to sell the Talgo trainset leased to Oregon. WSDOT bought 
that fifth trainset in 2003. According to the 2001 ORP, Oregon intended to buy new 
trainsets, but could not or simply did not find the money to buy one Talgo to support 
existing Cascade service in Oregon.150 Oregon continued to support Cascade service with 
the WSDOT and Amtrak Talgos.
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Washington
Efforts by WSDOT, the Blue Ribbon Commission, and nongovernment supporters such as 
the Discovery Institute Cascadia Project led to Referendum 51, an effort in 2002 to 
persuade Washington voters to approve a 9-cent-per-gallon gas tax to fund various 
transportation projects in Washington. Several other tax increases were designated for 
PNWRC improvements. Voters in Seattle favored Referendum 51, but it failed 37 percent 
to 63 percent statewide.151
Why did Referendum 51 fail? A few quotes from the Cascadia Report are illustrative:
• “Voters are not heeding the advice of business, labor and media leaders...and are 
distrustful of government and anyone affiliated with it.” (p. 22)
• “Political power is spread so thinly here that nobody can effectively assert leadership.” 
(p. 5)
• “...intergovernmental and special interest infighting....” (p. 30)
• “...the picture is one of electoral negativism, disappointing performance in the biggest 
program that was adopted by the voters (Sound Transit) and almost every imaginable 
variant of factional disagreement” (p. 1)
• “...usual fault lines of King County/City of Seattle/suburban cities....” (p 31)
Voters outside Seattle were insufficiently sympathetic to traffic congestion in Seattle. There 
has long been resentment by the more rural, conservative population east of the Cascade 
Mountains against the Seattle area; many of these people perceived Referendum 51 as 
another money grab by Seattle. Seattle itself has suffered through a period of tumult (World 
Trade Organization riots in 1999, loss of the Boeing Headquarters to Chicago, the telecom 
bust) which has challenged the political leadership. It is possible that Referendum 51 was 
too complicated and that the political leadership did a poor job explaining how a 9-cent-
per-gallon gas tax would be spent. “The Legislature and the Governor...punted to the voters 
on the investment package.”152 The Washington Legislature did not need voter approval to 
impose a 9-cent tax, but submitted the issue to the voters anyway.
There also may have been a desire to maintain the status quo. Business, labor, and media 
leaders could assert that the Seattle area economy desperately needed transportation 
infrastructure improvements, but perhaps many voters preferred to do nothing. Economic 
growth might attract more Californians to the Northwest, might cause environmental 
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damage, and so on. Voters with such an orientation did not share the perception that a more 
sophisticated economy was needed. The failure also calls into question one rationale for 
incremental approaches—that it should be easier to obtain funding in incremental steps.
WSDOT had been truncated before Referendum 51. Citizens Initiative 695 in 1999 
reduced Washington vehicle registration fees, and the fallout caused a 40 percent budget 
cut at the WSDOT Rail Office. As a result, the most important state agency supporting 
HSR was weakened at the time of the Referendum 51 debate.
The failure of Referendum 51 fundamentally set back plans for high-speed rail 
improvement in Washington and, therefore, in the PNWRC. The Washington political 
psyche has not recovered, and the PNWRC has not proceeded as planned.
Subsequently, the Washington legislature pursued a more modest Nickel Plan, a 5-cent gas 
tax for transportation projects throughout Washington. About 79 percent of Referendum 
51 projects were planned for the Seattle area. The Nickel Plan contained $165 million for 
passenger rail improvements, but nothing specifically for high-speed rail. The Nickel Plan 
was approved by the Washington legislature and enacted in May 2003. A popular 
referendum vote was not needed; no new taxing authority was created.
Washington claims to have invested $400 million in PNWRC projects so far, much of it for 
Cascades operational subsidies.153 In 1996, voters in the three counties of the Seattle-
Tacoma area (King, Snohomish, and Pierce) approved creation of Sound Transit. The 
purpose was to create and operate Sounder commuter rail service from Seattle north to 
Everett and south to Tacoma. Sounder commuter service has begun, with limited service 
and over budget. Sound Transit has invested almost $1 billion, some of which was used to 
double-track the main line and for signaling.154 Washington pays 50 percent of district 
costs. Rail improvements on BNSF track for Sounder trains will benefit the Cascades. For 
now, the Cascades are still limited to 79 mph.
In 2000, WSDOT proposed several specific projects to be done in the initial five-year phase 
for about $1.9 billion.155 To date, none have been built. Five projects have been targeted by 
WSDOT:
• Vancouver, Washington, rail yard bypass. There is a major bottleneck where BNSF freight 
trains from the north and south meet and cross UP freight trains from the east and south 
and try to cross an old rail bridge across the Columbia River. The bridge is a swing 
bridge that must be closed for river traffic. A two-track bypass would substantially 
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speed up the Cascades and improve freight movement through Vancouver, 
Washington.156 An environmental impact statement is complete, and WSDOT is now 
finishing the engineering work. $55 million in state funds may be available for 
construction in 2007-2009.
• Kelso to Martin’s Bluff 3rd main line. An environmental impact statement should be ready 
in late 2005, with construction scheduled to begin in 2009. The legislature may provide 
20 percent of construction funds if the federal government and the railroads pay the 
balance. The project will allow through trains, including the Amtrak service, to avoid 
local freight traffic associated with the Kalama and Longview ports.
• Point Defiance bypass. All trains follow the circuitous shoreline and single-track tunnels 
around the Tacoma Narrows. A 9-mile build-out of neglected track through Tacoma 
would shorten and straighten the route. This new alignment would be for passenger 
trains only; freight trains would continue to use the current BNSF route.157 Cascades 
would save about 11 minutes. An environmental impact study is scheduled for 2005; if 
funded, construction would not start until 2009. Reasons for such a lengthy schedule are 
not given, but are probably related to funding. The legislature may pay 20 percent of 
construction costs over 10 years if the federal government and the railroads pay the 
balance.
• Centralia Siding extension.
• Bellingham Siding extension.
WSDOT has spent $23 million for track improvements and sidings north of Seattle. One 
siding at Blaine, just south of the Canadian border, is called Swift Siding in honor of Rep. 
Al Swift, who helped begin the impetus towards HSR. Additional projects, for the most 
part double-tracking, are planned by Sound Transit (which is independent of WSDOT) and 
BNSF. Once all these improvements in rail infrastructure are in place, WSDOT expects 13 
to 14 daily round trips of 2.5 hours each way between Seattle and Portland. Ridership is 
projected to reach 2.2 million passengers per year.158 Passenger service cannot increase until 
these bottlenecks are removed. However, the only relevant construction activity south of 
Seattle appears to be two rail crossovers under construction in the Tacoma area, which will 
allow one additional Cascades round trip between Seattle and Portland by July 2005.
Current plans are reflected in the 2004 Regional Transportation Improvement District 
proposal to spend $12.8 billion. There is nothing in that plan for the PNWRC.159
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Oregon
Ridership is up on the Portland-to-Eugene segment of the PNWRC. There were 24,000 
passenger trips in 1993, 100,000 in 2000, and the trend continues.160 The reason is the 
popularity of the Cascade Talgos, not any major track or signal work in Oregon. Oregon 
DOT has spent $4.5 million for rail projects, but that money went for short-line purchase 
and for studies.161 Oregon DOT also claims to have spent $127 million in federal funds for 
track rehabilitation, but most of that money went to the short lines. It is unclear if, and 
how, the $31 million in the original plans for passenger train improvements was allocated 
or spent. Oregon states that it would cost $80 million to make track and signal 
improvements on the Oregon portion of the PNWRC.162 That money has not been 
allocated, and the current Oregon Transportation Plan update includes nothing for long-
distance rail or for the PNWRC.163
Oregon has spent a great deal of money to improve rail transportation in Portland, largely 
with the construction of Metropolitan Area Express (MAX). MAX, a light-rail system 
inaugurated in 1986, centered on a downtown Portland pedestrian transit mall. Three 
MAX lines, including one to the airport, now carry 80,000 passengers daily. The Yellow 
Line opened May 2004, ahead of schedule and $25 million under budget.164 MAX has no 
direct impact on high-speed rail, but it substantially increases the market for public 
transportation, which could feed into the PNWRC at Portland. Unlike commuter rail in 
California, the success of the MAX system has not translated into more general support for 
rail passenger service, perhaps because the remainder of the state has not benefited from 
commuter or intercity rail success.
British Columbia
There is no HSR activity in British Columbia. B.C.’s past contribution is limited to 
$30,000 for the PNWRC plans. Only one daily Cascade reaches Vancouver, B.C., at 
Washington’s expense. A second Cascade runs to Bellingham, Washington, about 20 miles 
from the B.C. border. An official in the B.C. Ministry of Transportation stated on the phone 
that the B.C. legislature has prepared a five-year review of transportation in the province, 
but that plan does not mention high-speed rail nor the PNWRC. He stated that there is no 
public interest, there is a reluctance to spend public funds on privately owned railroads, and 
the people are highway conscious. A few years ago the province did offer to invest 
$20 million (Canadian) in rail infrastructure, but the railroads refused. He did not say what 
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the conditions for the funding would have been on the railroads. At any rate, any PNWRC 
project in B.C. is “dead as a doornail.”165
Perhaps the reason could be a Canadian preference for a Canadian focus, not on the 
PNWRC. (The Pacific Northwest is a U.S., not a Canadian, designation.) Another reason 
could be that Oregon, even Washington, prepared studies and plans based on federal U.S. 
directives found within ISTEA and TEA-21.166 Perhaps the incentive was found in money 
available from federal sources for studies, regardless of whether U.S. federal money would 
become available for a high-speed rail system. The Dominion of Canada provided no such 
study and plan incentive for British Columbia, which had no desire to commit any 
provincial money.
Only 35 miles of PNWRC track is in British Columbia. The BNSF track crosses a bog, 
parallels a popular beach at White Rock, and feeds into a congested, 100-year-old Fraser 
River bridge at New Westminster. Traffic on the federally owned bridge is controlled by the 
Canadian National Railway, not the BNSF. It would cost $1 billion (Canadian) to build a 
new bridge. The B.C. Ministry of Transportation considers an upgrade of this route to be 
too expensive, although there are reports that Transport Canada, a Canadian federal agency, 
is studying Fraser River transportation issues.
Considering that the Winter Olympics will be held in Vancouver in 2010, the lack of 
interest in improving rail transportation in British Columbia is surprising. Where will the 
people come from, and how will they travel? Will visitors pour through the congested road 
crossing at Blaine, Washington? The Pacific Northwest is a major potential market for 
Olympic visitors, and a rail connection would seem to have considerable potential for 
success. Seattle and Portland are closer to Vancouver, B.C., than any major Canadian city is. 
The previously quoted representative of the B.C. Ministry of Transportation stated on the 
phone that there are no plans or intentions to improve the 35 miles of BNSF track in B.C. in 
preparation for the Olympics.
PNWRC is the only designated active corridor that extends outside the United States and 
outside the reach of ISTEA and TEA-21. There is no evidence of any U.S. diplomatic effort 
to promote the PNWRC with Canadian officials. Washington State appears to be the only 
official U.S. proponent of the Corridor. The results are instructive. Federal legislation 
induced states to prepare major studies and plans at federal expense. Washington studies 
were backed by genuine rail interest in the state government and by certain private 
agencies, but were not backed by a sufficient groundswell of enthusiasm by the Washington 
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public. Oregon studies are equally complete but reflect little genuine Oregon DOT 
enthusiasm for rail improvement; Oregon studies tend to contain a greater critical mass of 
statements that have no associated actions. British Columbia had no financial incentive to 
prepare studies and plans, prepared no such plans, and has performed no track or signal 
improvement for the Cascades. 
Observations
A few preliminary observations may be drawn from the PNWRC experience:
• As in the Florida and California cases, leadership is essential. Although there is 
leadership for HSR in Washington State agencies and private organizations, the lack of 
strong pro-HSR political leadership in the state has arrested development of the 
PNWRC. Political indecision in Washington also means that less motivated partners—
Oregon and British Columbia—will not contribute their share to the partnership.
• At least some of the incentive for various HSR plans and studies was found in the 
monies for plans and studies in federal legislation. It is questionable if Oregon would 
have produced several of the studies it did without ISTEA and TEA-21 funds. British 
Columbia had no such funding available and produced nothing. Did the availability of 
funding lead to unwanted studies, or did this exercise in taking advantage of federal 
money stimulate a state to increase the priority for HSR? The Oregon example is 
questionable at best.
• As in California and Florida, seeing is believing. Whenever politicians or other leaders 
visit and ride existing HSR systems, they return enthusiastic. Although a few political 
leaders in Washington State had visited HSR systems, those legislators had become 
relatively inactive by the time of the critical battle over Referendum 51. This further 
reinforces that dependence on elected officials, or perhaps any individual, to lead the 
effort will not provide the continuity that a project like HSR requires. Institutions that 
can continue regardless of who is in office or in a leadership role are probably a necessity.
• The incremental approach does not guarantee HSR success. Washington State proved 
success with the popular Talgos, but that was not sufficient to persuade voters of 
Referendum 51.
• Timing is crucial. Washington’s Referendum 51 was not voted on in an upbeat 
economy; the political psyche in Washington State has been poor since the World Trade 
Organization riots in 1999. Perhaps leadership could have delayed the vote for a sunnier 
day.
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• What should the federal role be, other than financing? Limiting the federal role to 
funding studies has not resulted in notable success in this corridor. What other federal 
actions or support might have made a difference here, or would federal action be 
construed as meddling? Probably not, if substantial federal construction funds are 
available.
Diplomatic efforts would have been appropriate to coordinate U.S. and Canadian efforts to 
promote and develop the PNWRC; that is not a role that a state government can perform. 
There is no evidence of any such efforts. A U.S. federal political or diplomatic role with 
Canada will be important if the PNWRC is to provide transportation to Vancouver, B.C., 
for the 2010 Winter Olympics. The state of Washington and the province of British 
Columbia cannot do it alone.
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KEY FINDINGS, LESSONS, AND THEMES FOR 
CONSIDERATION
At the end of each case study in the previous section, observations and assessments related to 
the specific cases being examined were provided. In addition, some overall findings stand 
out and bear mentioning, as they are likely to be relevant for other HSR efforts in the 
United States.
LEADERSHIP BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
First and foremost is the need for stronger leadership at the level of the federal government, 
in both vision and funding. With respect to the latter, rail (both passenger and freight rail) 
has long been neglected relative to other transportation modes, as the myth that railroads 
can pay for themselves is perpetuated.167 Between 1978 and 1999, federal transportation 
expenditures on rail totaled $18.3 billion (in constant 2002 dollars), roughly 3.6 percent of 
all transportation expenditures. This compares with $251.5 billion (49.9 percent) for 
highways; $58.3 billion (11.6 percent) for transit; $114.0 billion (22.6 percent) for air; and 
$58.0 billion (11.5 percent) for water transport.168 While all other modes experienced 
annual growth in expenditures of between 7.3 and 10 percent, rail actually experienced a 
decline during this period of 1.9 percent annually.169 According to Tim Lynch of Florida 
State University, this underinvestment in rail has resulted in the “serious erosion of 
potential ridership and high-end commodities shipments and resulting losses in user 
revenues and tax sources to support the mode.”170
High-speed rail initiatives suffer from lack of public support as well. Florida, for example, is 
mired in debates over how the project can be paid for without any public funds. Even when 
minimal amounts of public funding are available, responses do occur. In the Pacific 
Northwest, for example, it appears that the only reason any studies moved forward is 
because the federal government made public monies available. However, providing funds 
for studies alone is not enough; funding for implementation is also needed.
There is an overarching need for a national network strategy for rail at the federal level. As 
John Bennett, vice president of AECOM Consult, points out, it was leadership at the federal 
level that helped build the Interstate Highway System; a similar vision is needed for both 
passenger and freight rail in the United States as well as a vision for how rail connects to and 
interrelates with all the other modes around the nation.171 Otherwise, the United States will 
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continue to miss critical opportunities to make key linkages and enhance efficiency, not just 
for high-speed rail, but for regular passenger rail and for freight transport as well.172
Such a strategy must include several facets, including, but not limited to, the following:
• Incorporating passenger (including Amtrak), freight, and high-speed rail in the United 
States with a vision of how they are all related
• Envisioning how rail connects to and interrelates with all the other modes around the 
nation (and in cases like the Pacific Northwest, with other nations), particularly given 
trends to multimodal solutions
• Developing a funding program—tax-based, user-fee-based, or by some other method
• Providing guidance and standards for successful models. Without this last feature, states 
will continue to fill the void as they are currently doing, with a multitude of models 
ranging from constitutional amendments and legislation, to multistate compacts, to 
public-private partnerships, without a sense of what is most likely to succeed.
DEFINING COST
When cost-benefit analyses are developed for high-speed rail, the focus tends to be on the 
bottom line—how much money will be put in and how much will be generated. As long as 
one looks at cost as bottom-line driven, we are unlikely to see high-speed rail in the United 
States, given the capital investment needed to build such systems. Different results are often 
obtained when there is a broader tabulation, such as that being developed in California, that 
includes other costs of the transportation system (for example, additional cost of highway 
maintenance and repair) as well as the public as a whole (for example, increased levels of 
pollution as highway use increases) under the no-build option.173
Related to this is the need to be clear on not just the goals of the particular HSR project, 
but also on who is really reaping the benefits. If there are truly public benefits, then arguing 
for only private funding makes no sense and such projects are unlikely to succeed. If the 
public benefits are questionable, then private funding is a better choice.
INSTITUTIONALIZED SUPPORT
In many cases, the spark for building HSR has begun with a particular person in a particular 
state. It was Governor Bob Graham in Florida who visited Japan and believed Florida 
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should have a similar system. California had similar experiences, with leaders who traveled 
abroad and returned to the United States with the goal of building an HSR system similar 
to those in Europe and Asia. While the initial vision is important for beginning an effort, 
institutionalized support and organizational capability are critical for sustaining the effort 
and successfully implementing HSR. Without institutional buy-in for a project as well as 
the authority and capability to identify, gather, and manage funding, and the responsibility 
for seeing a project through, many HSR projects fail as soon as the key supporter or 
visionary leaves (as in Florida) or as economic downturns take place (as in California and the 
Pacific Northwest). Equally important, as is seen in Florida and to some degree California, 
constitutional amendments or legislative acts alone cannot replace the need for 
institutionalized support because the former can be challenged by successive governments 
or other stakeholders. Amtrak might be able to play an effective role here, providing some 
of the organizational capacity needed, but an integrated vision is needed first.
TECHNOLOGIES AND APPROACHES
Whether to develop a new HSR or an incremental HSR system depends greatly on what one 
hopes to accomplish and the context within which one is working. If the goal is to increase 
the numbers of commuters using rail instead of automobiles to minimize highway 
congestion, the key is to increase frequency and reliability of service, reduce travel times, 
and make the system more accessible. Such goals may be better met with an incremental 
approach that invests in station and equipment improvements, fixing curves and improving 
tracks, and enhancing signals, rather than new HSR. Alternatively, if one is trying to relieve 
air congestion between urban areas to free up space for more long-distance flights, a new 
HSR system linking key urban areas might be the better approach. Such discussions do not 
always occur; often the decision to pursue one approach versus another is based more on 
political factors than on a clear assessment and explanation of what the specific goals are and 
how best to meet them. Without such discussions, as all three cases demonstrate, whether 
incremental or new HSR is being pursued, plans may not progress.
OPPORTUNITIES
Opportunities for both incremental and new HSR exist in the United States and have for 
many years, particularly along those corridors federally designated as HSR corridors. 
Indeed, a 1997 FRA study on HSGT concluded that HSGT could develop appreciable 
ridership.174 The key will be getting at least one project fully implemented in a way that is 
76  Key Findings, Lessons, and Themes for Consideration
Mineta Transportation Institute
clearly HSR (as opposed to those that run at high speeds only for small distances rather than 
at sustained high speeds). Once a project is in revenue service, many of the concerns 
expressed by critics, including ridership projections and whether HSR can work in a 
country where cars and air transport are dominant, can be addressed by example.
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ENDNOTES
1. For high-speed rail, the distance is generally cited as 100-500 miles; for Maglev it is 
generally assumed to be 40-600 miles.
2. James Brooke, “Bullet Train Remakes Map of South Korea,” The New York Times
(April 2, 2004): W1+.
3. Anthony Perl, New Departures: Rethinking Rail Passenger Policy in the Twenty-First 
Century (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2002), p. 78.
4. What constitutes high-speed rail in this first category (incremental HSR) is of some 
debate. While some experts point to speeds of at least 125 mph, the U.S. Department 
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
BART Bay Area Rapid Transit
BN Burlington Northern
BNSF Burlington Northern Santa Fe
Caltrain Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board
Caltrans California Department of Transportation
CHSRA California High-Speed Rail Authority
CREATE Chicago Regional Environmental and Transportation Efficiency Project
DBOM&F design, build, operate, maintain, and finance
DEIS Draft Environmental Impact Statement
DOT Department of Transportation
EIR/EIS Environmental Impact Report/Environmental Impact Statement
EIS Environmental Impact Statement
FDOT Florida Department of Transportation
FEC Florida East Coast Railway
FEIS Final Environmental Impact Study
FHSRA Florida High-Speed Rail Authority
FHSRC Florida High-Speed Rail Committee 
Florida High-Speed Rail Commission
FHWA Federal Highway Administration
FOX Florida Overland eXpress
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
GAO General Accounting Office
HSGT high-speed ground transportation
HSR high-speed rail
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HST high-speed train
ICE Intercity Express
ISTEA Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991
KPH kilometers per hour
Maglev Magnetic Levitation
MAX Metropolitan Area eXpress
MDOT Michigan Department of Transportation
MIPRC Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Commission
MOA Memorandum of Agreement
MOS minimum operable segment
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MPH miles per hour
MTA Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Los Angeles County)
MWRRI Midwest Regional Rail Initiative
NACTO National Association of City Transportation Officials
NIMBY Not in My Back Yard
ODOT Ohio Department of Transportation
OIA Orlando International Airport
OOCEA Orlando Orange County Expressway Authority
ORDC Ohio Rail Development Commission
ORP Oregon Rail Plan
ORTA Ohio Rail Transportation Authority
PD&E Project Development and Environmental (process/study), State of Florida
PNWRC Pacific Northwest Rail Corridor
ROW right-of-way
RRIF Railroad Rehabilitation and Infrastructure Funding
SCAG Southern California Association of Governments
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SCRRA Southern California Regional Rail Authority
SRRTC Southern Rapid Rail Transportation Commission
TEA-21 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century
TGV Train à Grande Vitesse
THSRA Texas High-Speed Rail Authority
TIFIA Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act
TRAC Train Riders of California
TRB Transportation Research Board
UP Union Pacific
U.S. DOT U.S. Department of Transportation
WSDOT Washington State Department of Transportation
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